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REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
ELIZABETH POLLMAN* & JORDAN M. BARRY†
ABSTRACT
This Article examines what we term “regulatory entrepreneurship”—
pursuing a line of business in which changing the law is a significant part
of the business plan. Regulatory entrepreneurship is not new, but it has
become increasingly salient in recent years as companies from Airbnb to
Tesla, and from DraftKings to Uber, have become agents of legal change.
We document the tactics that companies have employed, including
operating in legal gray areas, growing “too big to ban,” and mobilizing
users for political support. Further, we theorize the business and lawrelated factors that foster regulatory entrepreneurship. Well-funded,
scalable, and highly connected startup businesses with mass appeal have
advantages, especially when they target state and local laws and litigate
them in the political sphere instead of in court.
Finally, we predict that regulatory entrepreneurship will increase, driven
by significant state and local policy issues, strong institutional support for
startup companies, and continued technological progress that facilitates
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political mobilization. We explore how this could catalyze new coalitions,
lower the cost of political participation, and improve policymaking.
However, it could also lead to negative consequences when companies’
interests diverge from the public interest.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of high-profile companies have devoted an
enormous amount of resources to pursuing lines of business that carry
tremendous legal risk. The laws governing these new business lines are
unclear, unfavorable, or even prohibit the activity outright. These
companies’ fortunes—whether they will go bankrupt or be worth
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billions1—often depend not only on the whims of the markets, but also on
the resolution of legal issues concerning a core aspect of their business.
These companies understand this, and each makes changing the law a
material part of its business plan. We call this activity “regulatory
entrepreneurship” and refer to the companies that engage in it as regulatory
entrepreneurs.
Regulatory entrepreneurs have experienced surprising political
successes, securing significant policy victories over some of the country’s
most entrenched industry groups. Perhaps the country’s most famous
regulatory entrepreneur, and an example that we will return to throughout
this Article, is Uber. Uber’s business is built around its popular smartphone
app.2 The app connects people who want rides with drivers in the vicinity
who are willing to provide them. Fares are determined based on an
algorithm that takes into account factors related to supply and demand, and
Uber takes a percentage of each fare.3 Uber is essentially running a taxi
dispatch service for the smartphone age.
However, in most cities, the taxicab industry is heavily regulated.4
Rules vary across jurisdictions, but they frequently require cabs to have a
special government-issued license or medallion; these licenses are typically
in very limited supply.5 Fares are often based on rigid prescribed formulas.6
A decade ago, many observers would have said that the legality of Uber’s
1. See In re Aereo, Inc., No. 14-13200-shl, 2014 WL 7721237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014); In re
Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No. C MDL-00-1369 MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30345, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. May 17, 2006) (“[Napster] declared bankruptcy after abandoning its efforts to comply with the
preliminary injunction entered by this court.”); Nathan McAlone, How Uber Became the Most Valuable
Startup in the World, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.inc.com/business-insider/how-uberbecame-the-most-valuable-startup-in-the-world.html; Sara Ashley O’Brien, Uber Is the Most Valuable
Startup in the World, CNN MONEY (July 31, 2015, 3:47 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/31/
technology/uber-50-billion-valuation.
2. UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride (last visited Mar. 12, 2017) (explaining that a user can use
their phone to “Tap a button, get a ride”).
3. See Aswath Damodaran, A Disruptive Cab Ride to Riches: The Uber Payoff, FORBES (June
10, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aswathdamodaran/2014/06/10/a-disruptive-cab-rideto-riches-the-uber-payoff (explaining the Uber business model).
4. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation: The
Paradox of Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 75–76 (1996) (“[N]early all large and medium-sized
communities regulate their local taxicab companies.”).
5. See, e.g., id. at 78 (explaining that “[t]ypically, taxis are regulated at the local level, with city
or county boards restricting the number of firms and number of taxis (with the issuance of medallions)”
and that municipalities like New York City have strictly limited medallions, causing the price “to reach
exorbitant levels”); Josh Barro, Under Pressure From Uber, Taxi Medallion Prices Are Plummeting,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2nELEJj (explaining the medallion system and market).
6. Barro, supra note 5.
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business was questionable at best.
Uber was undeterred by these legal issues. It has aggressively taken on
taxi regulations (and regulators) and worked to change the laws that govern
taxi services. In a very concrete sense, Uber and many other businesses are
built around and based upon a plan to change the law—and, in some
instances, to simply break the law in the meantime.7 For these companies,
political activity has become a critical part of business strategy.
To be sure, corporate political activity is not a new phenomenon. Such
activity has been the subject of federal regulation for more than a century,8
and has long been the subject of public controversy.9 But the conventional
image of corporate lobbying is working to influence the law that applies to
an existing, established, legal business. Such lobbying often seeks to
prevent or weaken cost-increasing regulations or insulate incumbents from
competition.10 For example, U.S. auto manufacturers have long lobbied
against increased fuel efficiency and emissions requirements because they
would make cars more expensive to produce—but these companies were
not founded on a plan to roll back preexisting laws that made automobile
production unprofitable or outright illegal.11
Regulatory entrepreneurship differs from conventional corporate
lobbying efforts. A regulatory entrepreneurial car company would be one
that makes cars knowing that changing the law is a material part of the
company’s business plan and vision for success. Electric car manufacturer
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. The Tillman Act prohibited “any national bank, or any corporation” from making “a money
contribution in connection with any election to any political office.” The Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat.
864 (1907) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1948)). See generally Adam Winkler, “Other People’s
Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871 (2004) (providing
history).
9. See Winkler, supra note 8, at 873–74 (arguing that early state and federal regulation of
corporate political spending was motivated by concern about the corrupt nature of corporate managers
misusing “other people’s money” as well as “fears about excessive corporate power”). See also LEE
DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME POLITICIZED AND
POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 47–71 (2015).
10. See Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyistsconquered-american-democracy/390822 (noting that when corporate political activity began to increase
in the 1970s, corporations hired lobbyists and “killed a major labor law reform, rolled back regulation,
lowered their taxes, and helped to move public opinion in favor of less government intervention in the
economy”).
11. Alan Fram, U.S. Auto Lobby’s Clout Flagging, PRESS-TELEGRAM: NEWS (June 17, 2009,
12:01 AM), http://www.presstelegram.com/article/ZZ/20090617/NEWS/906179854.
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Tesla Motors provides a good illustration: Tesla believes that it must sell its
electric cars directly to consumers in order for its business to succeed.12 To
make this business model a reality, Tesla has battled state laws that require
car manufacturers to sell through franchised dealerships.13 To date, Tesla
has achieved significant victories in several states.14
Moreover, modern regulatory entrepreneurs are using new tactics to
achieve their political goals. The conventional story of corporate political
power relies on gaining quiet access to officials, then leveraging that access
to exert influence behind the scenes.15 While regulatory entrepreneurs have
sometimes used these tried-and-true methods, they have become better
known, and arguably have experienced greater success, from the opposite
strategy: they make an issue as publicly salient as possible, rally the public
to their cause, then use their popular support as leverage to win the change
they want from resistant officials.
For example, consider Uber’s experience in New York City, the
nation’s largest market for taxi services and among the most tightly
regulated.16 When faced with resistance by New York Mayor Bill de
Blasio, Uber’s user base was its biggest weapon. Uber offered free rides to
12. There is some reason to think that traditional car dealerships have had poor incentives to
promote electric cars to date. Electric cars require salespeople to invest time and energy to learn about
them, and it currently takes a salesperson more time to complete the sale of an electric car than a
gasoline-powered one. Service centers are a major part of modern dealerships, and electric cars such as
Tesla’s do not require dealer servicing in the way that gasoline-powered cars do. Many dealerships that
sell electric and gas-powered cars discourage customers from buying the former and encourage them to
buy the latter. See, e.g., Eric Evarts, Dealers Not Always Plugged in About Electric Cars, Consumer
Reports’ Study Reveals, CONSUMER REP. (Apr. 22, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.consumerreports.org/
cro/news/2014/04/dealers-not-always-plugged-in-about-electric-cars-secret-shopper-study-reveals/
index.htm; Cliff Weathers, How Tesla and New Car Technologies Could Make Auto Dealers Obsolete,
SALON (Oct. 11, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/10/11/how_tesla_and_new_car_
technologies_could_make_auto_dealers_obsolete_partner.
13. Daniel A. Crane, Tesla and the Car Dealers’ Lobby, REGULATION, Summer 2014, at 10–14,
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2014/7/regulation-v37n2-3.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Matthew DeBord, Maryland Carved Out an Innovative Special Exception for Tesla
to Sell Cars Directly to Customers, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 15, 2015, 5:31 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/maryland-carved-out-a-special-exception-for-tesla-to-sell-cars-directly
-to-customers-2015-4; Jonathan Stempel, Tesla Prevails in Top Massachusetts Court Over Direct Sales,
REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2014, 5:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/tesla-motors-massachusetts-lawsuit
-idUSL1N0RG22Y20140915.
15. DRUTMAN, supra note 9, at 30. See also PEPPER D. CULPEPPER, QUIET POLITICS AND
BUSINESS POWER: CORPORATE CONTROL IN EUROPE AND JAPAN 190–97 (2011).
16. See Alison Griswold, Uber Won New York, SLATE (Nov. 18, 2015, 5:01 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/11/uber_won_new_york_city_it_only_took_fiv
e_years.html.
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passengers willing to attend a protest at City Hall on its behalf.17 It used its
app to contact drivers and passengers and mobilize them to express their
opposition to Mayor de Blasio’s proposal, flooding City Hall with over
20,000 e-mails in five days.18 Uber also added a notable feature to its app: a
“de Blasio” button that purported to show how users’ experience would
change if Mayor de Blasio implemented his proposed policy.19 The app
consistently predicted a twenty-five minute wait for a pick-up,20 then
directed users to a petition they could sign to oppose the mayor’s proposed
rule.21
Uber won its showdown in New York,22 at least for the time being.23
It has won many other fights in other jurisdictions across the country24 and
around the world25 using a similar playbook. Though it has lost its share of
battles,26 Uber’s overall success in taking on taxi regulations has enabled it
to grow into the world’s most valuable private startup corporation,27 with
17. Giulia Olsson, Uber Protests Loudly Outside City Hall, N.Y. OBSERVER (June 30, 2015, 4:50
PM), http://observer.com/2015/06/uber-protests-loudly-outside-city-hall. Uber also offered free t-shirts
and sandwiches to passersby if they agreed to join the protest. Id.
18. Chris Smith, Battlin’ Bill de Blasio’s Uber Fight, N.Y. MAG. (July 22, 2015, 10:38 AM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/07/battlin-bill-de-blasios-uber-fight.html.
19. Matt Flegenheimer & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, City Hall and Uber Clash in Struggle Over
New York Streets, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2mSzIPy; Tina Nguyen, Uber Takes Its
War on New York City to Another Level, VANITY FAIR (July 16, 2015, 2:43 PM),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/07/uber-takes-on-nyc-deblasio-over-proposed-driver-cap.
20. Nguyen, supra note 19.
21. Edward T. Walker, The Uber-ization of Activism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), https://nyti.ms/
2mSr3wD.
22. Matt Flegenheimer, Ending Fight, for Now, City Hall Drops Plan for Uber Cap, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2015, at A20; Griswold, supra note 16.
23. Josh Dawsey, New York City Council Bypasses Mayor Bill de Blasio on Uber Policy, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2016, 8:49 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city-council-bypasses-mayor-billde-blasio-on-uber-policy-1452217772; Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Is on a Collision Course with New
York City’s Mayor Again, VERGE (Dec. 4, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/4/
9851000/uber-nyc-bill-de-blasio-report-investigation-cap-tax-cuomo.
24. Karen Weise, This Is How Uber Takes Over a City, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 23, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-06-23/this-is-how-uber-takes-over-a-city. See also
Find a City, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
25. See Find a City, supra note 24. See also Ellen Huet, Uber’s Global Expansion in Five
Seconds, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/11/ubersglobal-expansion.
26. Jenny Che, 9 Countries That Aren’t Giving Uber an Inch, HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (Aug. 12,
2015, 12:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/uber-countries-governments-taxi-drivers_us_
55bfa3a9e4b0d4f33a037a4b.
27. McAlone, supra note 1; O’Brien, supra note 1.
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an estimated value of nearly $70 billion by mid-2016.28
And while Uber is the country’s highest-profile regulatory
entrepreneur, there are numerous others as well. For example, consider
Airbnb, the country’s second-most-valuable private startup.29 Its business is
connecting property owners and renters with travelers in need of short-term
lodging.30 This model has required Airbnb to contend with the many
jurisdictions that limit short-term rentals to hotels and similar enterprises;
Airbnb has changed these laws in many cities, including its hometown of
San Francisco.31 Furthermore, regulatory entrepreneurship is not a new
phenomenon. In the early 1900s, airline industry pioneers knew that their
success required significant changes to existing laws.32 For instance,
airlines lobbied for, and secured, federal legislation that repealed the
venerable common law doctrine that landowners owned all of the airspace
above their land.33
While regulatory entrepreneurship has enormous implications for the
28. Eric Newcomer, Uber Loses at Least $1.2 Billion in First Half of 2016, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
25, 2016, 10:50 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-25/uber-loses-at-least-1-2billion-in-first-half-of-2016; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Why Uber Keeps Raising Billions, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (June 20, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2kpV9Xx; Why Uber Is One of the Most Innovative
Companies of 2017, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 13, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.fastcompany.com/
3067460/most-innovative-companies/why-uber-is-one-of-the-most-innovative-companies-of-2017.
29. Davey Alba, Airbnb Confirms $1.5 Billion Funding Round, Now Valued at $25.5 Billion,
WIRED (Dec. 7, 2015, 7:49 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/airbnb-confirms-1-5-billion-fundinground-now-valued-at-25-5-billion; Scott Austin et al., The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club; Avery Hartmans, The $10 Billion Club:
Meet the 8 Most Valuable Startups in the US, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2017, 10:00 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-valuable-us-startups-2016-12/#8-dropbox-1.
30. Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy Regulation
and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 103–05 (2015).
31. See, e.g., id. at 107–12; Emily Badger, How Airbnb Just Changed the Housing Laws in San
Francisco, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Oct. 8, 2014), http://wapo.st/1vQC0zw.
32. See, e.g., NICK A. KOMONS, BONFIRES TO BEACONS: FEDERAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY
UNDER THE AIR COMMERCE ACT, 1926–1938, at 3–22 (1978); Christine Chmura, The Effects of Airline
Regulation, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Aug. 1, 1984), https://fee.org/articles/the-effects-of-airlineregulation/ (noting that “airline firms lobbied” for new laws and, without them, “the industry would not
have begun or become established as early as it did”); A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION
ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ (last modified Jan. 4, 2017, 4:42 PM)
(“Aviation industry leaders believed the airplane could not reach its full commercial potential without
federal action. . . . At their urging, the Air Commerce Act was passed in 1926.”).
33. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 75 Pub. L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 973; Air Commerce Act of
1926, 69 Pub. L. No. 254, 44 Stat. 568. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946) (“It is
ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe—
Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is
a public highway, as Congress has declared.” (footnote omitted)).
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law, it has received scant scholarly attention. This Article fills this gap in
the literature, making four original contributions.
First, in Part I, we define regulatory entrepreneurship and place it into
context. We discuss how regulatory entrepreneurship differs from other
forms of corporate political activity and why regulatory entrepreneurship is
a politically and economically significant phenomenon.
Second, in Part II, we examine techniques that regulatory
entrepreneurs often employ in their efforts to change the law. We identify
three creative techniques that modern regulatory entrepreneurs have
adopted in various combinations: They break the law and take advantage of
legal gray areas, real or imagined, asking forgiveness instead of permission.
They seek to grow “too big to ban” before regulators can act, sometimes
referred to as “guerilla growth.” Perhaps most dramatic, they mobilize their
users and stakeholders as a political force. We illustrate each of these
techniques with multiple real-world examples. We also discuss how
regulatory entrepreneurs have embraced conventional lobbying activities.
Third, we build on this analysis to determine the conditions that are
most likely to foster regulatory entrepreneurship. In Part III, we identify
and consider three variables that are of particular importance: the nature of
the business, the nature of the laws creating uncertainty, and the company’s
stage and status. We observe that businesses that are easy to scale up
quickly, that foster significant interaction between the company and its
stakeholders, and that appeal to an economically diverse audience are wellsuited for a regulatory entrepreneurship model because they can
accumulate a large body of stakeholders and mobilize them politically. We
also observe strategic reasons why state and local laws that do not carry
criminal penalties are often the target of regulatory entrepreneurship and
why startups are more prevalent regulatory entrepreneurs than more
established companies.
Fourth, we explore the future of regulatory entrepreneurship. We
begin Part IV by analyzing the prospects for regulatory entrepreneurship
going forward. There are reasons to think that some of the best
opportunities for regulatory entrepreneurship are already being exploited.
However, the market has become increasingly comfortable with regulatory
entrepreneurship as a business strategy, and the economic infrastructure
that has been assembled to date will facilitate new attempts at regulatory
entrepreneurship. Perhaps most importantly, information technology
continues to advance, making people more connected, generating large
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amounts of data about people’s preferences and activities, and making it
easier for citizens to express their preferences to policymakers. Combined,
these factors will create new opportunities for companies to mobilize large
groups of people on their behalf. Accordingly, we conclude that regulatory
entrepreneurship is likely to increase in the years to come.
We also consider how regulatory entrepreneurship will affect the mix
of laws and regulations that society ultimately enacts. One intriguing aspect
of regulatory entrepreneurship is its potential to combat laws and
regulations that provide concentrated benefits to particular interest groups,
while imposing diffuse costs on the public. In these circumstances, the
members of the relevant interest group have a strong incentive to advocate
for the law in question. However, because the law’s costs are spread over a
much larger group, those who would be hurt by the law have little incentive
to actively resist it.34 This is a well-known problem in the political
economy literature35 and can result in laws being enacted whose costs
exceed their benefits.36 Regulatory entrepreneurs can be a force against
such laws because they can lower the cost of civic engagement for their
users—the public—and create a dynamic in which a new actor is willing to
actively push for change.
Yet regulatory entrepreneurship is neither a panacea nor an
unmitigated good. Regulatory entrepreneurs are profit-seeking entities and
they will generally use their political power to pursue the results that are
best for themselves, not the results that are best for society. Accordingly,
34. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 189 (1990) (“[T]he high costs to the
public of becoming informed on issues which are specialized in their concentrated impact considerably
influence the competition for public attention.”). See also Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 343 (1974) (discussing the economic theory of
regulation and the idea that “economic regulation serves the private interests of politically effective
groups”).
35. Public choice theory elucidates how citizens can rationally decide not to participate in the
political process because the costs outweigh the benefits to individual actors. See, e.g., Levine &
Forrence, supra note 34, at 189. Further, because of the rational apathy of the public, it follows that the
law itself will tend to reflect the interests of small, cohesive interest groups rather than the public as a
whole. See Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. REV.
745, 770 n.131 (2013); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 920–21 (1994).
36. See generally FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997) (discussing how rent extraction and political
extortion can result in lawmaking to the detriment of the general public); George J. Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (discussing when and why interest
groups and industries are able to use regulations and the state for their own interests).
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regulatory entrepreneurship is unlikely to fully solve the pathologies of the
political system. Moreover, in some instances, regulatory entrepreneurship
may have significant negative effects on society. Overall, the likely effect
of regulatory entrepreneurship is to make the government more responsive
to business interests in general and certain types of companies in particular.
Whether one considers this a positive or negative development will depend
on one’s view of those interests and may vary by context, taking into
account the full range of social and economic implications.
I. DEFINING REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
All businesses face legal issues as part of their business operations.
And companies naturally would like the laws that apply to them to be
favorable.
But some companies pursue a line of business that has a legal issue at
its core—a significant uncertainty regarding how the law will apply to a
main part of the business operations, a need for new regulations in order for
products to be feasible or profitable, or a legal restriction that prevents the
long-term operation of the business. For these entrepreneurs, political
activity is generally a major component of their business models.
Essentially, these companies are in the business of trying to change or
shape the law. We term such businesses “regulatory entrepreneurs,” and
this class of business activity “regulatory entrepreneurship.” Regulatory
entrepreneurship is not a new phenomenon, but a spate of recent startup
and technology companies have made it an increasingly salient one.
Of course, businesses have long engaged in political activity;
corporations have been involved in U.S. politics since at least the 1800s.37
U.S. corporations and their trade associations spend billions of dollars each
year on lobbying efforts.38 Nonetheless, regulatory entrepreneurship differs
in several significant ways from what most observers envision when they
think of corporate political activity.
Historically, corporate lobbying has been primarily a reactive
37. See MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION,
ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY 6 (2000); Winkler, supra note 8, at 881.
38. See, e.g., DRUTMAN, supra note 9, at 8–9 (“A total of 3,587 individual corporations reported
a combined $1.84 billion in lobbying expenditures, roughly 56 percent of all the disclosed money spent
on lobbying in 2012. Add in another $553 million in spending by trade associations and $175 million in
spending by business-wide associations, and that’s $2.57 billion in combined spending—78 percent of
all the money spent on lobbying in 2012.”).
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endeavor. Companies have long lobbied to insulate themselves from
competition.39 The growth of the regulatory state, and the increasing
involvement of the government in the economic sphere, spawned a
responsive increase in corporate politicking as companies fought to resist
cost-increasing regulations—and, if possible, to capture the regulators and
use them as another tool to limit competition.40
But by and large, corporate political activities have been, and continue
to be, conducted by established businesses focused on protecting existing
profit centers. When companies have attempted to change the law, it has
often been around the edges of established, legal, profitable businesses in
order to protect them or give them more room to grow: Energy companies
lobby on energy policy.41 Car companies resist higher fuel efficiency
standards.42 Pesticide companies fight regulations on the use of
pesticides.43 Other examples abound. But these are not regulatory
entrepreneurship. In each of these cases, changing the law has been a
relatively small component of the companies’ overall operations, and not a
material part of the business plan.44
Regulatory entrepreneurs face a different set of circumstances. They
pursue lines of business knowing that changing the legal environment is
crucially important for the business’s growth, or even its legality, and with
the intention of effecting that change. Changing the law is not a side
project, it is a material part of the business plan.
For example, many states prohibit vehicle manufacturers from selling
directly to customers (“direct distribution”); instead, manufacturers must
sell their cars through independent dealers.45 States enacted these laws to
39. See id. at 3 (noting that corporate lobbying was historically “sparse and mostly defensive”).
40. See id. at 49, 55 (describing “the political awakening of corporate lobbying” that began in the
1970s after a period of new major regulatory laws).
41. Annie Snider, It’s Oil Co. vs. Oil Co. in Latest RFS Battle, POLITICO MORNING ENERGY
(Aug. 19, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-energy/2016/08/its-oil-co-vsoil-co-in-latest-rfs-battle-215971.
42. See Fram, supra note 11.
43. Anne C. Mulkern, Pesticide Industry Ramps Up Lobbying in Bid to Pare EPA Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/02/24/24greenwire-pesticide-industryramps-up-lobbying-in-bid-to-42970.html.
44. Of course, this does not mean that these forms of corporate politicking are unimportant. Even
individually minor lobbying efforts can have major effects on the law and the political process,
particularly over long periods of time.
45. Death of a Car Salesman, ECONOMIST (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
business/21661656-no-one-much-likes-car-dealers-changing-system-will-be-hard-death-car-salesman;
Open Letter from Elon Musk, Chairman, Prod. Architect & CEO, Tesla Motors, to the People of N. J.
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protect car dealers; in addition to imposing dealers as mandatory
middlemen, they also make it difficult for manufacturers to terminate a
dealership, even in the event of poor service or salesmanship.46 These laws
have been in place for over fifty years, despite multiple attempts by major
car companies to pare them back.47
Electric car manufacturer Tesla Motors was founded in 2003 with the
goal of proving “that electric cars could be better than gasoline-powered
cars.”48 Because of the differences between gasoline-powered cars and
Tesla’s electric cars, especially with respect to the way that they are
serviced, Tesla concluded that car dealers would not have good incentives
to promote their cars and that the company needed to be able to sell directly
to consumers.49 Yet direct distribution was prohibited in many states. Tesla
thus pursued development of its electric cars with the understanding that a
change in the law was a vital piece of its business model.50 Given the
political realities surrounding dealer franchise laws, Tesla knew that it had
to create its own lobbying efforts to battle the car dealers’ lobby for state
legislative reforms.51 Car dealers have blocked Tesla in several states, but
the company has fought back and is slowly winning most of its direct
distribution fights.52
Regulatory entrepreneurship often happens when businesses are built
(Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.teslamotors.com/blog/people-new-jersey.
46. Musk, supra note 45.
47. See Crane, supra note 13, at 12; Death of a Car Salesman, supra note 45.
48. TESLA MOTORS, https://www.teslamotors.com/about (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
49. Nikki Gordon-Bloomfield, Consumer Reports: Dealerships Don’t Understand, Like Electric
Cars, TRANSPORT EVOLVED (Apr. 22, 2014), https://transportevolved.com/2014/04/22/consumerreports-dealerships-dont-understand-like-electric-cars; Weathers, supra note 12.
50. Tesla’s registration statement in its initial public offering acknowledged: “Implementing our
business model is subject to numerous significant challenges, including obtaining permits and approvals
from local and state authorities, and we may not be successful in addressing these challenges. . . . [W]e
will need to persuade customers, suppliers and regulators of the validity and sustainability of our
business model.” Tesla Motors, Inc., Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) 22–23
(June 2, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1318605/000119312511157135/ds1a.htm. See
also Crane, supra note 13, at 10; TESLA MOTORS, supra note 48.
51. Crane, supra note 13, at 10; Catherine Ho, PowerMoves: Scrambling to Shape Refugee
Policy After Paris, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2015), http://wapo.st/1X8cQqF (noting that Tesla Motors
hired a lobbying firm to lobby on automotive industry issues).
52. Death of a Car Salesman, supra note 45. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has come
out in support of direct distribution auto sales. See Marina Lao et al., Direct-to-Consumer Auto Sales:
It’s Not Just About Tesla, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 11, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/competition-matters/2015/05/direct-consumer-auto-sales-its-not-just-about-tesla.
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upon new technology, and many of our examples involve companies in the
technology sector. There are several reasons why this is the case. First, new
technologies can shift the tradeoffs surrounding particular laws; restrictions
that made sense, or at least had little impact, before a new technological
development may become real problems afterwards. Second, many new
technologies and technology companies in recent years have been based on
platform models, or more broadly related to communications, which have
made it easier to inform and mobilize large groups of people. As we
discuss below, mobilizing users and other stakeholders has been a key
driver of contemporary regulatory entrepreneurship.53 Finally, new
technologies and technology companies are often hyped as the “way of the
future.” This can provide a certain degree of cachet that is politically
useful.54
But, while regulatory entrepreneurs are often technology-related
companies, they do not need to be; nothing about our definition of
regulatory entrepreneurship requires that.55 The ultimate fighting
championship (“UFC”) provides a good illustration: When Lorenzo and
Frank Fertitta bought the business in 2001, the UFC’s main product—
mixed martial arts combat for money—was barred in almost every state.56
Through a concerted and strategic lobbying effort led by president Dana
White, UFC ultimately reversed these laws; New York, the final holdout,
legalized UFC in March 2016.57 Four months later, the Fertittas sold the
UFC for $4 billion—2,000 times what they paid for it in 2001.58 This
makes UFC a very successful regulatory entrepreneur, even though neither
its product nor its primary means of distributing that product (television)
was built on new technology.
53. See infra Part II.A–C.
54. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
55. We take a broad approach in our examination, while recognizing that a categorization or
taxonomy could prove useful in further studies. For example, it might prove useful to distinguish
between companies that are focused on technology vs. those that are not, startups vs. established
companies, and companies that break the law or operate in gray areas vs. those that comply.
56. Adam Hill, A Timeline of UFC Rules: From No-Holds-Barred to Highly Regulated,
BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 24, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1614213-a-timeline-of-ufc-rulesfrom-no-holds-barred-to-highly-regulated.
57. Bryan Armen Graham, New York Ends Ban and Becomes 50th State to Legalize Mixed
Martial Arts, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2016, 6:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/mar/22/
new-york-legalizes-mma-ufc.
58. Martin Rogers, UFC Sold to WWE-IMG for $4 Billion; Dana White Will Still Run Day-toDay Operations, USA TODAY (July 11, 2016, 12:46 PM), www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ufc/2016/07/
11/ufc-sale-wwe-img-dana-white/86937834.
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There are other examples of regulatory entrepreneurs pushing to
change laws based on changing social preferences instead of new
technological tradeoffs. For instance, ResponsibleOhio is a would-be seller
of marijuana. It spent over $20 million unsuccessfully pushing a marijuana
legalization initiative that would have made its business viable (and likely
extremely profitable).59 It is a regulatory entrepreneur, but not a technology
company.
Four more points about the definition of regulatory entrepreneurship
merit emphasis. First, we define regulatory entrepreneurship as a
phenomenon that applies with respect to a line of business. For example,
Google (now organized under Alphabet) runs a well-known, clearly legal,
and highly profitable search engine business. The company has also poured
large amounts of resources into developing self-driving cars—a line of
business that will not be viable or financially successful in the long term
unless states change their laws to permit self-driving cars to use public
roads.60 Google was well aware of this and entered the self-driving car
business intending to convince states to open their roads to its cars. By
doing so, Google was engaging in regulatory entrepreneurship, even if its
continued viability did not depend on a change in the law. In other words,
we focus on defining regulatory entrepreneurship with respect to a line of
business, rather than with respect to business entities, because that
functionally captures the distinctive type of entrepreneurial and political
activity that we believe merits study and discussion.
Second, because regulatory entrepreneurship is primarily a profit59. Anne Saker, What You Need to Know About Marijuana Initiative, CINCINNATI (July 24,
2015, 12:52 PM), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2015/06/17/marijuana-ohio-ballotinitiativeresponsibleohio/28897081. The group, ResponsibleOhio, ultimately failed. Jackie Borchardt, ProMarijuana Group ResponsibleOhio Dead, Founder Says, Won’t Press Ballot Issue in 2016,
CLEVELAND, http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2016/01/pro-marijuana_group_responsibl.html
(last updated Jan. 19, 2016, 9:25 AM); David A. Graham, Why Did Ohio’s Marijuana-Legalization
Push Fail?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/where-didohios-marijuana-legalizers-go-wrong/414061.
60. See Claire Cain Miller, When Driverless Cars Break the Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2014),
http://nyti.ms/1qzzhKt (“Only four states and the District of Columbia have passed laws specific to
driverless cars, some just allowing manufacturers to test cars and none answering every legal question
that might come up.”); Salvador Rodriguez, California, Google Ready for Autonomous Vehicle
Showdown in 2016, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015, 9:45 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/californiagoogle-ready-autonomous-vehicle-showdown-2016-2233290 (“California’s lead in the race to
autonomous, self-driving vehicles could come to a grinding halt should the state adopt draft measures
announced this week that would all but make Google’s driverless vehicles illegal.”).
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driven activity, it does not depend on legal formalities. Regulatory
entrepreneurs do not necessarily care whether they effect a legal change on
a de facto or de jure basis. For example, if the relevant regulatory body
credibly commits to not enforcing the law on the books, that is roughly as
good, from the entrepreneur’s perspective, as formally amending the law.
Third, regulatory entrepreneurship is conceptually distinct from
regulatory arbitrage. Regulatory arbitrage arises when parties change the
form of their transaction, but not its economic substance, in order to effect
more favorable regulatory treatment.61 Regulatory arbitrageurs essentially
take the law as a given, then try to take advantage of the law as best they
can by making minor alterations to their behavior. Regulatory
entrepreneurs, in contrast, seek to change the law as part of their plan to
earn profits. Rather than adjusting to the legal environment, regulatory
entrepreneurs seek to shape the legal environment to suit their needs
instead.
Finally, we note that the definition of regulatory entrepreneurship
raises a natural question of boundaries: At what point does changing the
law become “important enough” to a company’s business plan to make the
company a regulatory entrepreneur? The answer hinges on the specific
facts and circumstances, and there will be marginal cases about which
reasonable people will disagree. Regulatory entrepreneurship is best
thought of as a matter of degree. We do not think that the exact location of
the boundary is the main issue; rather, defining and providing a term for
regulatory entrepreneurship enables it to be studied for the distinctive
activity it is and for ease of discussion. We are more interested in
examining the implications that follow from the phenomenon than policing
its precise boundaries, and we readily acknowledge that this is a rich area
for further inquiry and debate.
61. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229–30 (2010) (defining
regulatory arbitrage as “the manipulation of the structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between
the economic substance of a transaction and its regulatory treatment”). See also Jordan M. Barry, On
Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 69, 73 (2010) (“[R]egulatory arbitrage is a
phenomenon that follows from having regulations that fail to take economic reality into account.”);
Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227
(1997) (“Regulatory arbitrage consists of those financial transactions designed specifically to reduce
costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential regulations or laws.”).
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II. HOW REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURS INSTIGATE LEGAL
CHANGE
In this Part, we explore how effective regulatory entrepreneurs weave
together both time-tested and innovative new tactics to create a larger
strategy for changing the law.
A. BREAKING THE LAW OR TAKING ADVANTAGE OF LEGAL GRAY AREAS
Many regulatory entrepreneurs follow the maxim that it is better to
beg forgiveness than to ask for permission. In this context, that means that
it is better to enter markets and start providing services to the public—
legally or otherwise—than to seek approval from regulators.
Companies often justify this behavior by construing some gray area in
the law as permitting the action in question. A motivated entrepreneur can
often manufacture a legal gray area, blurring the line between outright
lawbreaking and aggressive interpretation. For example, consider an
entrepreneur with a business built around a new technology. Even if
existing regulations or statutes use broad language that, when read literally,
prohibit the company’s activity, the company can take the view that
officials were not considering the company’s activity when they wrote
those rules—how could they, when the technology the business is built on
did not yet exist?62
It is difficult to know from an outside perspective whether particular
companies are deliberately violating laws, and in many instances there is at
least room for argument about the matter. For our purposes, it suffices (and
we believe it is fair) to say that when regulatory entrepreneurs move into a
market, they often take an aggressively favorable reading of the relevant
law, and that the correctness of their interpretation—that is, whether or not
they are actually complying with the law initially—is not a first-order
concern.63
62. Cf. Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transportation Innovation, and the
Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 69, 73–74 (2015) (“New transaction
structures . . . may simply not fit well into an existing regulatory regime that was designed with a
particular transaction template in mind.”).
63. The many public reports of startup companies ignoring notifications of their illegal activity
suggest that this is part of a larger strategy combining business and politics. See, e.g., Serena Saitto,
Inside Big Taxi’s Dirty War with Uber, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 11, 2015, 5:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-11/inside-big-taxi-s-dirty-war-with-uber (“[U]ber’s
strategy has been to launch services regardless of the rules and then leverage its popularity to force
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Yishan Wong, a Silicon Valley angel investor who was an early
PayPal employee and the former CEO of Reddit, explained a similar view:
[I]f you are a startup who feels that the violation of a law (or an
excursion into a grey and questionable/undefined area of the law) will
allow you to create a business that provides enormous value to people,
the tactically wise thing to do is to move forward and try to build the
business.64

This state of affairs—operating and growing a business while taking
the questionable position that the company is acting within the bounds of
the law—generally benefits regulatory entrepreneurs. Sometimes
regulatory entrepreneurs proactively engage regulators, but often they
simply push forward with the business while hoping that regulators and
enforcement agencies will not come knocking. Thus, in sum, many
regulatory entrepreneurs’ approach includes strategically operating in a
zone of questionable legality or breaking the law until they can (hopefully)
change it.
For example, early in Uber’s operations, the company was reported to
have received and ignored a cease-and-desist demand from transit
regulators in San Francisco.65 The company has followed the same
playbook in other cities when problems have arisen, even internationally.
Uber and its executives have been embroiled in legal battles in Paris, for
instance, after refusing to shut down its “UberPop” service following the
passage of a transportation law that made it illegal.66 Despite police
crackdowns, Uber repeatedly paid drivers’ fines and continued to advertise
on radio stations.67
Uber’s main competitor, Lyft, has taken a similar approach. In a court
filing, the New York State Office of the Attorney General claimed:
As it has done in every other city in which it operates, defendant has
regulators to adapt. So far, that approach has succeeded in about 30 markets in North America . . . .”).
64. Yishan Wong, Comment to Why Has Airbnb Not Been Sued or Regulated out of Existence?,
QUORA (Dec. 13, 2013), https://www.quora.com/Airbnb/Why-has-Airbnb-not-been-sued-or-regulatedout-of-existence.
65. Marcus Wohlsen, Uber’s Brilliant Strategy to Make Itself Too Big to Ban, WIRED (July 8,
2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/ubers-brilliant-strategy-to-make-itself-too-big-to-ban.
66. See Liz Alderman, Uber’s French Resistance, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 3, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1dLfunb; Aurelien Breeden & Mark Scott, Uber Executives’ Trial in Paris Is Postponed,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1VmXGCj.
67. Alderman, supra note 66 (quoting the general manager of Uber France: “We tell [drivers], if
you get fined, come to us and we’ll support you. We want them to feel as confident as we feel about
what we’re doing and our interpretation of the law”).
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simply waltzed into New York and set up shop while defying every law
passed whose very purpose is to protect the People of the State of New
York. Despite being warned and told to cease and desist by three
separate regulatory and enforcement agencies, defendant has thumbed its
nose at the law and continued with its plan to launch in what could
become its largest market.68

As another example, technology investors have placed bets in the
mobile payments and virtual currencies space, an area of innovation that
raises significant legal questions. Marc Andreessen, the principal of a
leading venture capital (“VC”) firm, recounted the advice that one of his
lawyers had given on the topic of the virtual currency Bitcoin:69 “Good
news guys. Here you have a financial instrument that can be
simultaneously regulated as a currency, a commodity, and a
security . . . [R]egulators will fight over who, exactly, gets to regulate it,
and VC’s job is to sneak through the fight.”70
B. GROWING TOO BIG TO BAN
Timing plays an important role in a strategy to break the law or
operate in a gray area of the law: Early movers may establish a market
position that will in turn affect their leverage vis-à-vis the government and
the ultimate success of their business model. To again quote angel investor
Yishan Wong, “[t]he law and its subsequent enforcement are often defined
by the will of the people.”71 Moreover, “if there is a business that a lot of
68. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary
Injunction, People v. Lyft, Inc., No. 451476/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2014), http://cdn2.voxcdn.com/assets/4744462/MOL.PDF.
69. Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin
Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 277 (2015) (“As a type of virtual currency, Bitcoin is a medium of
exchange that (1) is electronically created and stored, and (2) lacks the backing of a government
authority, central bank, or a commodity like gold. Like traditional currency, virtual currencies such as
Bitcoin can be used to purchase goods and services from any person that is willing to accept it as a form
of payment.” (footnotes omitted)).
70. Carmel DeAmicis, Andreessen: Bitcoin Is Like the Early Internet, PANDODAILY (Oct. 3,
2013),
http://pandodaily.com/2013/10/03/andreessen-bitcoin-is-like-the-early-internet
(emphasis
added). See also Aaron J. Greenspan, CEO, Think Computer Corp., Written Statement Before the U.S.
Senate Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov’t Affairs 13 (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.aarongreenspan.com/writing/20131118.hsgacstatement.pdf (quoting Marc Andreessen);
Noam Scheiber, Uber and Airbnb Are Waging a Libertarian War on Regulators, NEW REPUBLIC (May
20, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117837/airbnb-uber-wage-war-regulators-army-customers
(discussing how many financial and payment technology companies have made a “rational calculation”
to take a “shoot-first/ask-questions-later strategy”).
71. Wong, supra note 64.
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people like but is in gross violation of the law, it is typically allowed to
stand, either via a subsequent modification of the law, clarifications in the
grey area which end up being favorable to the business, or lax
enforcement.”72 He also explains succinctly how this applies with respect
to Airbnb:
[T]he likely time it will take for entrenched business interests to react to
Airbnb, for a debate about enforcement and clarification of the law, and
then for regulations to be proposed, debated, amended, passed, and then
enforcement measures taken is likely to be more time than it will take for
Airbnb—moving at internet speed—to establish itself as a globally
viable business. By the time that happens, the market (i.e. the democratic
majority) will probably have shifted to favor its interests, so long as they
continue to operate the business in a way that benefits travelers and
would-be amateur hoteliers.73

Other commentators have aptly described this approach as “guerrilla
growth” or aiming to grow “too big to ban.”74 Growth is important for
almost any business, but it is particularly so for a regulatory entrepreneur.
This is because in addition to improving the company’s valuation and
prospects for profits, growth also strengthens the company’s prospects with
regulators that might seek to ban or regulate the business activity. Business
growth can translate to consumer popularity that becomes difficult for
regulators to ignore.
Uber again illustrates this point clearly. Uber makes its money by
taking a percentage of the driver’s fare.75 On numerous occasions, Uber has
dramatically cut its prices in order to increase its user base, valuing growth
over profitability.76 At times, Uber has cut its prices to such a great extent
that it effectively paid customers to use its service.77
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Callum Borchers, DraftKings and FanDuel Vie to Become ‘Too Big To Ban,’ WASH. POST
(Nov. 12, 2015), http://wapo.st/1HDE4nm; Conor Dougherty & Mike Isaac, Airbnb and Uber Mobilize
Vast User Base to Sway Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1kuepmv; Wohlsen, supra
note 65.
75. Ellen Huet, Uber Tests Taking Even More From Its Drivers With 30% Commission, FORBES
(May 18, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/05/18/uber-new-uberx-tieredcommission-30-percent.
76. Wohlsen, supra note 65.
77. Id. (describing how Uber usually takes a 20 percent commission, but that it cut fares in San
Francisco and Los Angeles by 25 percent and made up the difference to drivers, essentially paying part
of the fare for its passengers in those areas). See also Uber for Business, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/business (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (noting in January 2016 that “the uberx
option is up to 40% cheaper than a taxi”).
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Loss leaders are well-known in business, but it is rare for a company’s
main product to be one.78 But for Uber, this was considered a savvy
strategy because “[i]f [Uber] gets big enough quickly enough, the political
price could become too high for any elected official who tries to pull Uber
to the curb.”79 Another commentator remarked: “[I]t has already outgrown
the stage at which its growth could have been squelched by aggressive
regulatory action, à la the Internet-TV startup Aereo. At this point, any
regulatory crackdowns will only serve to define the contours of Uber’s
dominance.”80 Politicians have taken notice of the political dimension to
this growth. A California State Assembly member who sponsored a
measure to regulate Uber remarked: “They wanted to get themselves
established very quickly as the bully you didn’t want to mess with.”81
Other recent examples of companies adopting the too-big-to-ban
strategy include fantasy sports gaming sites FanDuel and DraftKings.
These companies charge a fee for users to play online fantasy sports games;
the companies keep a percentage of the fees and pay out the rest as prizes.82
Both FanDuel and DraftKings have prioritized growth over profits; they
have returned large percentages of their revenues back to users in the form
of prize money and spent millions on advertising during sports
broadcasts.83 These firms are credited with creating a new multi-billion
dollar industry in fantasy sports.84
78. A loss leader is a product intentionally sold at a loss in order to stimulate sales of other,
profitable items.
79. Wohlsen, supra note 65 (“By drastically lowering its prices, Uber is doing more than
increasing its customer base. It’s cultivating constituents—the people who will complain when someone
in power tries to take away their Uber.”).
80. Will Oremus, The End of the Taxi Era, SLATE (Jan. 8, 2016, 5:58 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2016/01/yellow_cab_in_san_francisco_is_just_th
e_beginning_uber_s_war_on_cabs_is.html.
81. Rosalind S. Helderman, Uber Pressures Regulators by Mobilizing Riders and Hiring Vast
Lobbying Network, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2014), http://wapo.st/1yO3AR9.
82. Ben Fischer, FanDuel vs. DraftKings: Are We Seeing the Future of Sports Wagering?, N.Y.
BUS. J., http://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/blog/techflash/2014/11/fanduel-vs-draftkings-are-weseeing-the-future-of.html (last updated Nov. 18, 2014, 12:49 PM).
83. Noah Kulwin & Kurt Wagner, It’s No Good! DraftKings, FanDuel Deemed Illegal in New
York, RECODE (Nov. 10, 2015, 4:29 PM), http://www.recode.net/2015/11/10/11620556/its-no-gooddraftkings-fanduel-deemed-illegal-in-new-york.
84. Id. See also Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Daily Fantasy Confronts a New Reality, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 15, 2016, 3:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/daily-fantasy-confronts-a-new-reality1481831889 (noting that as of December 2016, the fantasy sports industry is forecast to reach $5.3
billion in revenue by 2021).
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After a determination by New York’s attorney general that the gaming
sites were breaking the law, FanDuel and DraftKings both released
statements invoking their size and popularity and questioning the state’s
attempt to shut them down. FanDuel’s statement read, in part: “This is a
politician telling hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers they are not
allowed to play a game they love and share with friends, family, coworkers
and players across the country.”85 DraftKings similarly stated: “We
strongly disagree with the reasoning in [the] opinion and will examine and
vigorously pursue all legal options available to ensure our over half a
million customers in New York State can continue to play the fantasy
sports games they love.”86
FanDuel and DraftKings ultimately won that battle by securing
legislation that made clear that their businesses are legal.87 Their size and
popularity were key factors in their victory.88 In explaining his support for
the bill, Governor Andrew Cuomo cited the sites’ popularity and how
legalization would result in more revenues that the state could use to fund
education.89 Other supporters of the bill raised the same points,90 and
several other states have since passed legislation.91
C. MOBILIZING USERS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS FOR POLITICAL
POWER
An especially interesting strategy in the regulatory entrepreneurship
toolbox has been to use customers and other stakeholders to fight corporate
political battles. Not all companies are well-loved enough by the public for
this to be viable, but for those with the support of their users and
85. Kulwin & Wagner, supra note 83.
86. Id.
87. Joe Drape, Win for DraftKings and FanDuel Opens Door for Sports Betting in New York,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2aOAxa6.
88. Id. After facing significant lobbying and legal costs, the companies agreed to merge. Joe
Drape, Draft Kings and FanDuel Agree to Merge Daily Fantasy Sports Operations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
18, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2k44jJa.
89. Drape, supra note 87.
90. Id. (quoting Assemblyman J. Gary Pretlow as saying that fantasy sports “have the potential to
generate millions of dollars in revenue for New York State”).
91. Id.; Don Van Natta, Jr., The Inside Story of the Quick Rise and Quicker Fall of DraftKings
and FanDuel, ESPN (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/ 17374929/otlinvestigates-implosion-daily-fantasy-sports-leaders-draftkings-fanduel; Legislative Tracker: Daily
Fantasy Sports, Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP., http://www.legalsportsreport.com/ dfs-bill-tracker
(last visited Mar. 17, 2017) (listing the adoption of daily fantasy sports legislation in Colorado, Indiana,
New York, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, and Virginia).
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stakeholders, it has proven a particularly effective tactic.
Uber has repeatedly and successfully adopted this approach. One of its
key political strategists, David Plouffe, has drawn explicit parallels
between customers and campaign volunteers.92 The company sends alerts
to riders on their phones, asking them to sign petitions or contact public
officials at key political moments for the company.93 Its users often
respond quickly and in vast numbers; the company reports that nearly half
a million riders have signed its petitions.94
For example, Virginia’s Department of Motor Vehicles sent Uber a
cease-and-desist order notifying the company that its service was illegal
and that it needed to immediately cease all operations in the state.95 Uber
responded by sending a notice to all of its Virginia users, along with the
contact information for the ordinarily low-profile state official involved in
the decision. Within a few days, hundreds of angry Uber customers had
emailed the official, inundating his inbox and requiring him to work all
weekend to respond.96 Within forty-eight hours, “the state’s transportation
secretary instructed the DMV not to interfere with Uber drivers.”97 A few
weeks later, state officials approved a temporary operating permit that
allowed the company (as well as its competitor Lyft) to continue its normal
operations.98
Similarly, when the Illinois General Assembly passed a restrictive
measure that would negatively impact Uber’s business, Uber responded by
mobilizing its army of Illinois users. It inserted a splash screen on its
smartphone app and emailed Illinois riders requesting that they sign a
digital petition asking the state governor to veto the bill. Twenty-five
thousand supporters signed the petition in its first hour, and the governor
eventually vetoed the bill.99
In Portland, when faced with a city ordinance that was an obstacle to
its black car ride service, Uber announced on its blog that it would run a
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Helderman, supra note 81.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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one-day promotion delivering free ice cream around the city.100 The ice
cream “delivery” event provided the company with a database of people
who were likely to be sympathetic to its goals, and who it could then turn
into advocates for its ride sharing service.101 Almost 1,700 people signed a
petition to allow the company to operate in the city.102 When Uber later
launched its UberX service in Portland before the service had been
officially sanctioned, the company carefully used hyper-local marketing to
appeal to local residents, such as creating an ad with a well-known quirky
unicyclist bagpiper as the first rider.103 The company then threw itself a
party at which attendees could take photos with protest signs or send a
postcard to the mayor.104 In the first four hours, more than 7,000 people
signed a new petition in support of Uber operating its service in
Portland.105
Airbnb has also leveraged its users for political advantage. The
company announced plans to create and support “home-sharing clubs” in
100 U.S. cities.106 The purpose of these clubs is to help residents campaign
against local rules restricting short-term rentals. Airbnb expects hosts and
guests who use their service to run the clubs, which have been likened to
local unions.107
Airbnb adopted this strategy on the heels of its $8.4 million ground
campaign in San Francisco, in which the company mobilized hosts and
guests to defeat a local proposition that would have limited short-term
rentals.108 Over 2,000 volunteers knocked on over 285,000 doors in the city
in order to gain political support for Airbnb’s cause.109 Until recently, such
mobilized grassroots support for a multibillion-dollar company has been
unheard of, or is at least highly unusual.110
100. Weise, supra note 24.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Brooke, Portland’s Very-Own Unipiper Is Rider Zero!, UBER (Dec. 5, 2014),
newsroom.uber.com/pdx/portlands-very-own-unipiper-is-rider-zero.
104. Weise, supra note 24.
105. Id.
106. Heather Somerville, Airbnb to Create 100 Clubs to Advocate for Home-Sharing, REUTERS
(Nov. 4, 2015, 7:06 PM), www.reuters.com/article/us-airbnb-sanfrancisco-idUSKCN0ST2RL20151105
(quoting Airbnb’s global policy chief as stating, “[W]e’ll spend what it takes to succeed”).
107. Id.; Dougherty & Isaac, supra note 74.
108. Somerville, supra note 106.
109. Id.
110. In the summer of 2016, Airbnb raised money at a $30 billion valuation—higher than the
valuation of the mega-hotel chain Marriott International. See Dougherty & Isaac, supra note 74;
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And indeed, this kind of regulatory entrepreneurship raises the
question of whether such political support can be called grassroots when it
has been catalyzed from the top-down as part of a corporate strategy. It was
Airbnb’s own global policy chief, previously a D.C. political operative,
who framed the business as a “movement” at a San Francisco news
conference.111
Similarly, when fantasy sports gaming sites FanDuel and DraftKings
found themselves in the political spotlight, they catalyzed fans and
informed them of their efforts and what the fans could do to help.112
FanDuel’s CEO sent an open letter to users including a link to a petition
that users could sign “to protect your right to play fantasy sports” and “to
remind officials how deep and wide the support for fantasy sports is.”113
Within two weeks, the company secured more than 145,000 signatures.114
These companies have parlayed their popular support into considerable
legislative success.115
D. MORE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL TECHNIQUES
Finally, regulatory entrepreneurs have also taken advantage of the full
range of traditional lobbying techniques that established firms have
typically employed. This includes tactics such as putting political
operatives on the board of directors or hiring them as key advisors and
using professional lobbyists.116
Maureen Farrell & Greg Bensinger, Airbnb’s Funding Round Led by Google Capital, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 22, 2016, 3:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-raises-850-million-at-30-billionvaluation-1474569670.
111. Dougherty & Isaac, supra note 74 (“There is going to be more people doing home-sharing
tomorrow than there are today, there is going to be more the day after that . . . . This is now a
movement.”). Some examples more closely resemble a grassroots model, such as food truck
entrepreneurs that have rallied their customers to help change laws governing their business. See Beth
Kregor, Food Trucks, Incremental Innovation, and Regulatory Ruts, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 1,
14 (2015) (“Because [the new generation of food trucks] use social media to connect with their
customers, they can rally the public to participate in political debates, upending the usual public-choice
paradigm. They have done so successfully in DC and other cities.”).
112. Open Letter from Nigel Eccles, CEO, FanDuel, to FanDuel fans (Oct. 2015),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FanDuel-Regulation-Letter.pdf.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Legislative Tracker: Daily Fantasy Sports, Sports Betting, supra note 91.
116. These tactics are anything but new. For example, in the 1830s, the Philadelphia and Trenton
Railroad Company acquired a New Jersey turnpike with the plan of converting it into a railroad track
connecting New York and Philadelphia—even though it knew that the New Jersey legislature had
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Placing political operatives on the board of directors of a company,
particularly an early-stage startup company, signals that regulatory affairs
are crucial to the business and that changing existing laws or making new
laws may be key to the business model. Take, for example, Hyperloop One,
a regulatory entrepreneur startup inspired by billionaire technology mogul
Elon Musk’s idea of a futuristic vacuum-tube transport network that could
transport passengers and freight at over 700 miles an hour.117 The company
was started with the understanding that it would have to change the law or
create new law to support its nascent, never-done-before technology—
persuading governments to support futuristic infrastructure, obtaining
rights-of-way through cities and across vast distances, and navigating
transportation laws written for a different era. The technical challenges
involved in developing a hyperloop transportation network are enormous,
but the political challenges are equally monumental.
Hyperloop has prepared for political and legal battles by getting
influential political operatives involved before those battles have even
begun. When the Chief Technology Officer of Hyperloop first met the
company co-founder, he said, “I can build the technology—you’ve got to
get me [the] right of way to do it.”118 The co-founder replied, “We’ve got
Jim Messina on our board,” referring to former White House deputy chief
of staff and the campaign manager for President Obama’s 2012
reelection.119 In its early stages, the company had also met with major
politicians, such as then-U.S. Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid.120
President Obama himself had been briefed on the early-stage startup
ostensibly granted another company the exclusive right to railroad transportation between those cities.
To overcome this obstacle, the company hired prominent lawyers, including then-U.S. Attorney
General Roger B. Taney, to issue opinions stating that the prior grant was no obstacle. MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 134–36 (1977).
117. Bruce Upbin, Hyperloop Is Real: Meet the Startups Selling Supersonic Travel, FORBES (Feb.
11, 2015, 6:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceupbin/2015/02/11/hyperloop-is-real-meet-thestartups-selling-supersonic-travel. Hyperloop One is not the only U.S. company working to develop this
technology. Paresh Dave, How Two L.A. Start-Ups Are Racing to Develop Transportation More
Amazing Than Self-Driving Cars, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
business/technology/la-fi-0927-cutting-edge-hyperloop-20150927-story.html; Alex Davies, A Star
Engineer Just Launched His Own Hyperloop Outfit, ‘Arrivo,’ WIRED (Feb. 9, 2017, 3:37 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/star-engineer-just-launched-hyperloop-outfit-arrivo.
118. Caroline O’Donovan, Hyping the Hyperloop: How a Moonshot Technology Could Become a
Reality, BUZZFEED (Oct. 11, 2015, 6:01 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/carolineodonovan/hyping-thehyperloop-how-elon-musks-dream-could-become-a-rea#.ccRqWaX5k.
119. Id. Jim Messina has also worked for Uber and Airbnb. Id.
120. Upbin, supra note 117.
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company and its vision for ultra-high-speed transportation.121 The company
has also developed a relationship with Eric Garcetti, the mayor of Los
Angeles, where the startup is based.122 He has joked: “I’ve been part of the
marketing department. I talk about it all the time. I’ve talked to [U.S.
Secretary of Transportation Anthony Foxx], the vice president, the
president—and they’re not paying me a thing!”123 Many other companies
have adopted similar strategies.124
Hiring professional lobbyists is another technique that regulatory
entrepreneurs use. For example, consider once more electric car
manufacturer Tesla Motors. To succeed in its fight against dealer franchise
laws, Tesla has had to battle the car dealers lobby and create its own
lobbying efforts for state legislative reforms.125 The lobbyists that Tesla has
hired have been key to its efforts to help win over state legislators. In
Texas, for example, Tesla spent over half a million dollars on lobbyists in
both 2014 and 2015.126 Tesla hired several notable local lobbyists,
including Mike Toomey, a trusted advisor to Governor Rick Perry; Karen
Steakley, an ex-deputy legislative director for Governor Rick Perry; Craig
Chick, a former senior policy advisor for notable Texas legislators; and
Adam Goldman, whose brother is a state lawmaker.127 The company
started building a coalition of lawmakers and business groups supportive of
its cause and hosting legislative staffers at policy forums and company
121. Id.
122. O’Donovan, supra note 118.
123. Id.
124. Other notable examples of companies involving political strategists in key business positions
include Uber (David Plouffe), Airbnb (Chris Lehane), and Theranos (Henry Kissinger; George Shultz;
Sam Nunn; Bill Frist). Dougherty & Isaac, supra note 74; Helderman, supra note 81; Jennifer Reingold,
Theranos’ Board: Plenty of Political Connections, Little Relevant Expertise, FORTUNE (Oct. 15, 2015,
12:49 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/10/15/theranos-board-leadership. Regulatory entrepreneurs have
also engaged consultants who come through the “revolving door.” For example, William Haraf, who
had been the Commissioner of the California Department of Financial Institutions, and on whose watch
California’s money transmission law was implemented, became Managing Director of Promontory
Financial Group, a consultancy that advises startups in the virtual currency space. See Greenspan, supra
note 70, at 14.
125. Crane, supra note 13, at 12.
126. Grant Gerke, Tesla Motors Secret Weapon: Thoughts and Lobbying Efforts, TESLARATI
(Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.teslarati.com/tesla-motors-secret-weapon-thoughts-lobbying-efforts; David
Saleh Rauf & Neal Morton, Tesla Gears Up for Texas Lobbying Blitz, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS
(Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Tesla-gears-up-for-Texas-lobbyingblitz-5967219.php.
127. Rauf & Morton, supra note 126.
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receptions.128 These traditional political lobbying techniques have been
aimed at helping the company to level the playing field against the
powerful car dealer lobby, which has been politically active and generous
in making political expenditures for years.129 A Tesla vice president
explained: “We understood the political equations. . . . We would be stupid
not to prepare and equip ourselves to argue effectively in this
Legislature.”130
We emphasize that many regulatory entrepreneurs have used these
traditional political tactics as complements, not substitutes, to their more
innovative techniques. Consider Uber’s experience in Virginia after
receiving its cease-and-desist letter.131 At the same time that Uber was
mobilizing its Virginia riders to e-mail their displeasure to state officials, it
also hired a team of lobbyists to work on its behalf behind the scenes.132
These lobbyists submitted the proposed temporary operating permit that
state officials later granted.133 Similarly, when faced with unfavorable state
legislation in Illinois, Uber did more than mobilize its riders. It “assembled
a powerhouse Springfield lobbying team” that included a former lawyer for
top Illinois Democrats, a former state Republican chairman, and Jack
Lavin, who had served as the governor’s chief of staff eight months
earlier.134 After the Illinois governor vetoed the bill, Uber used traditional
lobbying techniques to successfully fight the legislative effort to override
the veto. Ultimately, the issue was resolved “in a private meeting room in
the Capitol.”135 Uber struck a deal with the bill’s sponsor; he agreed to
abandon the veto override effort, and company executives agreed to
support less onerous legislation, which became law that year.136
128.
129.

Id.
See, e.g., Bob Adelmann, Tesla Sales Model Upsetting Traditional Auto Dealers, NEW
AMERICAN (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/markets/item/17906-teslasales-model-upsetting-traditional-auto-dealers (“In the 2011–2012 election cycle, according to the
National Institute on Money in State Politics, auto dealers and their employees donated more than $15
million to state and local candidates. In that same cycle, Tesla donated $500.”).
130. Rauf & Morton, supra note 126. For discussions of how lobbyists achieve influence and
theories of lobbying, see Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 70–72 (2006); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution,
64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 219–21 (2012).
131. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
132. Helderman, supra note 81.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.; Ray Long, Quinn Lays Political Traps for Rauner on Way out the Door, CHI. TRIB. (Jan.
13, 2015, 7:10 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/chi-quinn-leaves-political-
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Many other regulatory entrepreneurs echo Uber’s experience of
quietly maneuvering behind the scenes at the same time that they are
rallying the public on their behalf.137 To help pass legislation in New York,
FanDuel employed well-connected political heavy hitters, including
Michael Garcia, a former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, and Michael Mukasey, formerly a federal judge in the Southern
District of New York and Attorney General of the United States.138
III. CONDITIONS THAT FOSTER REGULATORY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
In this Part, we use the insights from our analysis in Part II to identify
and consider three basic groups of factors that are particularly important to
fostering or discouraging regulatory entrepreneurship. First, we explore
factors related to the line of business in question. Second, we consider lawbased factors related to the nature of the regulatory uncertainty that the
entrepreneur faces. Third, we compare the relative advantages of startup
corporations versus more established businesses.
A. BUSINESS-RELATED FACTORS
Some lines of business are better suited to a regulatory
entrepreneurship model than others.
One important factor is the amount of profit that the entrepreneur
stands to gain from the business, assuming that the law in question is
amended or shaped in the entrepreneur’s favor. The larger the potential
profits, the greater the incentive to pursue the business and take on the task
of changing the law.
Further, as discussed in Part II, modern regulatory entrepreneurs often
employ both conventional politicking strategies as well as a mix of more
innovative techniques to effect legal change. The traditional methods that
corporations have used to exert influence—hiring lobbyists, putting
politically connected people on their boards, revolving door hiring
practices, and spending money on political messaging—primarily require
traps-for-rauner-on-way-out-door-20150112-story.html.
137. Drape, supra note 87 (“Lobbying and legal costs . . . have shredded [FanDuel and
DraftKings’] bottom lines and will continue to do so.”).
138. Eccles, supra note 112. FanDuel also worked with state lawmakers to craft legislation that
would address critics’ concerns, such as verifying the age of fantasy sports players. Id.
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money. The amount of money that the company will be willing and able to
commit to a particular effort to change the law is generally capped by the
future profits that the company expects to earn from the change.139 The
more profitable the company anticipates its business will be, the more it
may be willing to spend on conventional politicking strategies.
Money is also helpful for implementing the newer techniques that
regulatory entrepreneurs have pioneered. However, the most important
input for these strategies is a user base that can be mobilized as a political
force. What, then, characterizes businesses with the “right” kind of user
base? Such businesses possess three chief characteristics: scalability,
connectedness, and mass appeal.
Scalability refers to the business being able to expand its user base
quickly and easily. For businesses to successfully mobilize users against a
regulatory crackdown, they must have sufficient users to fight back at an
early enough point in time. It helps to grow quickly so that regulators, who
often move slower than entrepreneurs, are unable to squelch the business
before it reaches a critical mass. Many regulatory entrepreneurs employ a
guerrilla growth strategy to achieve exactly this result. The success of such
a strategy depends on growing quickly, and this cannot be done if
expanding one’s user base requires customized service or extensive and
slow capital investment. For example, an advertising agency’s business is
not scalable because its service is customized for each client and cannot be
standardized. By contrast, a company whose main product is software is
easily scalable; the extra cost of adding a new user is negligible.
But while having a large user base is often necessary, it is not
sufficient. A large user base is of little help if those users are unwilling to
act; the company must also be able to mobilize its users. This likely
depends on several things. The first is the frequency with which users
interact with the company. User interactions are opportunities for the
company to inform and activate users; the more interactions, the better the
company’s prospects. Next is whether the format through which the
company interacts with its users makes it easy for the company to send
users information or otherwise direct them to action. How much
information the company has about its users matters as well; the more that
139. This includes indirect gains. For example, if the company believes that winning a big
regulatory battle in one jurisdiction increases the chances that it will win victories in other jurisdictions
as well, then the profits from those jurisdictions should factor into the company’s resource allocation
decision.
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the company knows about its users, the more it can engage them in a
targeted manner. For example, legislators are likely to be more responsive
to comments received from their own constituents than from voters they do
not represent. If the company knows where its users live, it may be able to
direct individual users’ gestures of support (e-mails, phone calls, signed
petitions, and so forth) to their particular representatives, amplifying their
effect. Finally, how motivated will the company’s user base be to act on the
company’s behalf? This will depend not only on the frequency with which
users interact with the company, but also on the significance of those
interactions. To the extent that the company taps into feelings of identity or
more significant needs, users are likely to be more willing to engage.
The composition of the company’s user base matters as well. Several
studies have examined what drives policy changes in the United States, and
two findings are key for regulatory entrepreneurship: First, there is a strong
status quo bias—it is hard to change the law.140 Second, some studies find
that the chances of changing the law are greatest when high-earning
citizens support the change.141 Thus, a user base that contains affluent users
may significantly increase a company’s chance of success.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that it is also helpful to have a
compelling story to tell. People remember personal stories; putting the right
face on an issue is a potent political tool.142 Thus, it helps to have a product
that benefits economically diverse consumers and users, including middle
or working-class people, whose stories may be more likely to evoke
sympathy and support among viewers.143
For example, in November 2015, San Francisco was considering
Proposition F, an initiative that would have increased restrictions on short140. See, e.g., Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q.
778, 786 (2005); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 573 (2014).
141. See, e.g., Gilens, supra note 140, at 788–89; Gilens & Page, supra note 140, at 568–70. But
see Omar S. Bashir, Testing Inferences About American Politics: A Review of the “Oligarchy” Result,
RES. & POL., Oct.–Dec. 2015, at 1 (taking issue with this conclusion); J. Alexander Branham et al.,
When Do the Rich Win?, POL. SCI. Q. (forthcoming July 2017), https://jabranham.com/papers/when-dothe-rich-win.pdf (similar); Peter K. Enns, Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation, 13
PERSP. ON POL. 1053, 1060–61 (2015) (similar).
142. See TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: HOW EMOTIONAL APPEALS IN
POLITICAL ADS WORK 19 (Susan Herbst et al. eds., 2006).
143. Middle class support may be as important as the support of the most affluent voters. See
Bashir, supra note 141, at 1; Branham et al., supra note 141; Enns, supra note 141, at 1060–61.
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term rentals in San Francisco. In the days leading up to the vote, Airbnb
and its supporters blanketed the airwaves with advertisements urging voters
to oppose the measure.144 A number of ads opposing Proposition F featured
the stories of people who frequently rent out various spaces on a short-term
basis.145 These people talked about the difficulties of living in such an
expensive city, and most told stories about particular financial needs that
short-term renting helped them to manage, such as financially supporting
elderly parents and paying for childcare.146 One ad featured a couple stating
that home sharing enables them to volunteer and teach English to Tibetan
refugees and impoverished children.147 By contrast, Proposition F
supporters’ advertisements suggested a more unflattering view of their
opponents, such as “Save the Moguls,” which cast rich commercial
landlords as the face of short-term rentals.148 Airbnb ultimately won its
battle against Proposition F, as voters rejected it by a ten-point margin, and
the company has continued to navigate the law and politics of short-term
rental laws.149
Other companies have successfully employed similar tactics. To take
another example, during Uber’s battle for New York, it ran advertisements
in which Uber drivers highlighted how becoming an Uber driver had
improved their lives.150 They spoke about how their pre-Uber lives were
144. Nancy Watzman, Pro-Airbnb Advertising Dominated Recent Political TV Ads in San
Francisco, ARCHIVE (Nov. 4, 2015), https://blog.archive.org/2015/11/04/pro-airbnb-advertisingdominated-recent-political-tv-ads-in-san-francisco/ (finding that anti-Proposition F ads constituted
roughly two-thirds of all political TV ads; the ratio of television ad minutes opposing Prop F to those
supporting it was over 120:1; the ratio of television ad minutes opposing Prop F to those related to the
mayoral race was more than 35:1).
145. See SF Against F, Maria Is Renting Out Her Home Office, ARCHIVE (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://archive.org/details/SFElections2015ads.
146. SF Against F, Meet Cathryn, Your SF Neighbor, ARCHIVE (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://archive.org/details/SFElections2015ads; SF Against F, Meet Kate from Glen Park, ARCHIVE
(Nov. 4, 2015), https://archive.org/details/SFElections2015ads.
147. SF Against F, Please Join Ken and Ashish from the Castro, ARCHIVE (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://archive.org/ details/SFElections2015ads.
148. Sharebetter, Save the Moguls, ARCHIVE (Nov. 4, 2015), https://archive.org/details/
SFElections2015ads. See also Stuart Schuffman for Mayor, […]Against Prop F, ARCHIVE (Nov. 4,
2015), https://archive.org/details/SFElections2015ads.
149. Josh Barbanel, The Enforcement of Airbnb Law Postponed Again, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4,
2016, 8:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-enforcement-of-airbnb-law-postponed-again1478305423; Kia Kokalitcheva, Airbnb Is Ready to Work with S.F. in Fight Over Illegal Home
Rentals, FORTUNE (Nov. 14, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/14/airbnb-sf-data-sharing/; Carolyn
Said, Prop. F: S.F. Voters Reject Measure to Restrict Airbnb Rentals, S.F. GATE (Nov. 4, 2015, 6:56
AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Prop-F-Measure-to-restrict-Airbnb-rentals-6609176.php.
150. Killing 10,000 NYC Jobs, with One Taxi-Backed Bill, UBER NEWSROOM (June 30,
2015), https://newsroom.uber.com/us-new-york/killing-10000-nyc-jobs-with-one-taxi-backed-bill;

414

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:383

characterized by difficulties finding jobs, being unable to pay their
mortgages, and struggling to make ends meet.151 One described becoming
an Uber driver as “a blessing” and “probably the best thing that’s happened
in [his] life.”152 Another said “We don’t just pick people up. We pick
ourselves up. We pick our families up.”153 Uber asserted that it would
create 10,000 jobs in New York City over the next year and urged voters to
tell Mayor de Blasio, who had received significant donations from the taxi
industry, “Don’t put taxi donors ahead of jobs.”154 The advertisement
closed with an Uber driver saying “millionaire [cab] medallion owners
don’t need help. People like us do.”155
Companies that do not have sympathetic faces to put forward may
have more difficulty achieving their political goals. Companies working on
driverless cars must contend with public concern that the technology will
eliminate thousands of existing jobs.156 Or consider Tesla Motors’ options
for garnering mass public support. Until recently, its cheapest car had a
$70,000 price tag, which is well out of most people’s price range, and the
number of workers Tesla hires at one of its distribution centers pales in
comparison to the number of people in a jurisdiction who drive for Uber or
host for Airbnb.157 Tesla has made other arguments to support its
Uber, Mayor de Blasio's Proposal Will Destroy 10,000 Jobs, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xFOQ6ID6lvk. See also Dan Rivoli, Uber Slams Mayor de Blasio
with TV Ad, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 16, 2015, 9:05 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/
uber-slams-mayor-de-blasio-tv-ad-article-1.2293201.
151. Josh, supra note 150.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. See also Alan Feuer, Uber Drivers Up Against the App, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016),
https://nyti.ms/2mSBC2O (“Uber mobilized millions of dollars and an all-star team of political
tacticians, but it also made use of the sympathetic image of hard-working immigrants telling City Hall
that Uber put food on the table for their families.”).
156. See, e.g., Martin Ford, The Rise of Automated Cars Will Kill Thousands of Jobs Beyond
Driving, GIZMODO (May 7, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://gizmodo.com/the-rise-of-automated-cars-willthousands-of-jobs-and-n-1702689348; Zack Kanter, Commentary, How Uber’s Autonomous Cars Will
Destroy 10 Million Jobs and Reshape the Economy by 2025, CBS LOCAL (Jan. 27, 2015, 3:02 PM),
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2015/01/27/how-ubers-autonomous-cars-will-destroy-10-million-jobsand-reshape-the-economy-by-2025-lyft-google-zack-kanter; Chunka Mui, Will Driverless Cars Force a
Choice Between Lives and Jobs?, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013, 9:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
chunkamui/2013/12/19/will-the-google-car-force-a-choice-between-lives-and-jobs;
Sam
Tracy,
Autonomous Vehicles Will Replace Taxi Drivers, but That’s Just the Beginning, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/autonomous-vehicles-will-_b_7556660.html (last updated
June 10, 2016).
157. See, e.g., Airbnb in San Francisco: By the Numbers, AIRBNB CITIZEN (Apr. 2, 2016),
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regulatory aims, but they have not always resonated with the public.158
At the same time, in politics, perception and reality need not always
match. DraftKings and FanDuel have tried to make their users the public
face of their fight, lamenting that state governments are preventing funloving sports fans from playing games that they enjoy.159 They have
generally succeeded with this approach, even though the vast majority of
winnings on these sites go to a small group of sophisticated players who
treat it like a business, entering hundreds of contests a day and using
advanced mathematical techniques to maximize their profits.160 To the
extent this information became publicly known, it weakened the
companies’ ability to effectuate legal change, and they have had to make
adjustments to the way their sites work.161
This underscores a larger issue regarding public perception of a
company and its business. The more positively the business is viewed, the
better its political chances, both in terms of mobilizing public support as
well as in lobbying behind closed doors. Thus, companies and businesses
that are seen as particularly beneficial to society, altruistic, or simply
“cool,” have advantages in regulatory entrepreneurship.162 Companies can
https://san-francisco.airbnbcitizen.com/airbnb-in-san-francisco-by-the-numbers (stating that, as of
March 2016, there were 9,448 active listings in San Francisco); Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Doubles
Number of Drivers—Just as de Blasio Feared, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Oct. 6, 2015, 1:34 PM),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20151006/BLOGS04/151009912/uber-doubles-number-ofdrivers-just-as-bill-de-blasio-feared (stating that, as of October 2015, “there are now over 30,000 Uberaffiliated vehicles in New York City”); Fred Lamber, Tesla Offers a Distribution Center with 150 Jobs
to Connecticut in Last-Ditch Effort to Pass Direct Sales Bill, ELECTREK (May 2, 2016, 4:07 PM),
https://electrek.co/2016/05/02/tesla-distribution-center-connecticut-direct-sales-bill/; Farhad Manjoo,
The Genius of Tesla, SLATE (May 10, 2013, 5:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/
technology/2013/05/tesla_model_s_the_electric_car_company_is_a_little_bit_apple_a_little_bit.html.
158. Tesla has argued that its cars will have a beneficial impact on the environment, particularly
with respect to carbon emissions, and has appealed to the principle of consumer freedom. See, e.g.,
Musk, supra note 45.
159. Kulwin & Wagner, supra note 83.
160. See, e.g., Joshua Brustein & Ira Boudway, You Aren’t Good Enough to Win Money Playing
Daily Fantasy Football, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-09-10/you-aren-t-good-enough-to-win-money-playing-daily-fantasy-football; Drew
Harwell, All the Reasons You (Probably) Won’t Win Money Playing Daily Fantasy Sports, WASH. POST
(Oct. 12, 2015), http://wapo.st/1ZuAQbo. DraftKings and FanDuel must also contend with historic
(though waning) unfavorable views of gambling and fighting battles in courts as well as in the political
arena.
161. Natta, Jr., supra note 91.
162. Tesla is a good example of this. Many environmentally conscious consumers concerned
about carbon emissions are excited about electric cars. Its openness with its intellectual property has
also drawn accolades in certain circles. See, e.g., Mike Ramsey, Tesla Motors Offers Open Licenses to
Its Patents, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2014, 1:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tesla-motors-says-it-
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also gain an edge when they are seen as representing the future; no
politician wants to be seen as fighting the tide of progress or stifling a
growing industry that would help constituents over the long run.
These business-related factors help explain why regulatory
entrepreneurship has become salient in recent years. Many of the most
successful startup companies in the last few years are “platform”
companies.163 Platform companies profit by using technology to connect
buyers and sellers on a proprietary platform. Examples include Uber, Lyft,
Airbnb, and others.164
Platform business models are enormously scalable; if new users wish
to join the system, they can be added quickly and easily. Moreover, since
these businesses are built around the platform, these companies are wellequipped to communicate with their users. Depending on the product and
user in question, the user’s level of commitment to the company can be
quite large. For example, an Uber driver or an Airbnb landlord—or a
provider on another platform, such as TaskRabbit,165—may reap hundreds
or even thousands of dollars a week via their interaction with the app.166 In
addition, in many instances the regulatory entrepreneur will have a great
will-allow-others-to-use-its-patents-1402594375. This also potentially explains why Tesla has enjoyed
success in its fight against dealer laws, while major car manufacturers failed in their attempts to do the
same.
163. See generally ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY 69–84 (2016) (explaining the
business models of platform companies); Benjamin G. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and
Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 293 (2016) (analyzing the regulation of platform companies); Orly Lobel, The Law of the
Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016) (explaining the definition of platform companies and listing
over two dozen); Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law: The
Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901 (2015) (discussing various
sharing economy peer-to-peer platform companies); The Unicorn List, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/
unicorns (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (listing startup companies valued at $1 billion or more and
including platform companies such as Uber, Airbnb, Lyft, BlaBlaCar, FanDuel, and DraftKings).
164. The Unicorn List, supra note 163.
165. Jackie Zimmermann, This Is What It Takes to Make $2,000 a Week Working on TaskRabbit,
TIME (Mar. 12, 2015), http://time.com/money/3714829/working-for-taskrabbit/.
166. See, e.g., Davey Alba, Instacart Shoppers Can Now Choose To Be Real Employees, WIRED
(June 22, 2015, 5:46 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/06/instacart-shoppers-can-now-choose-realemployees; Rachel Gillett, Here’s How Much You Could Make As an Uber or Lyft Driver in 20 Major
US Cities, BUS. INSIDER (July 20, 2015, 11:40 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-uberdrivers-make-in-each-city-2015-7; Sarah Kessler, Secrets of Running a Six-Figure Airbnb Business,
FAST COMPANY (Nov. 5, 2013, 1:25 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3021179/secrets-of-running-asix-figure-airbnb-business; Derek Thompson, The Uber Economy, ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/01/is-uber-a-middle-class-job-creator-or-not/384763.
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deal of information about the user, such as where she lives and how much
she uses the entrepreneur’s product, that may potentially allow the
entrepreneur to leverage that user more effectively.167
The most successful of these businesses have wide appeal. New York
Uber users include high earners willing to pay extra to get a ride home
immediately at the end of a rainy night out, middle-class outer borough
residents who have trouble finding cabs in their neighborhoods, and Uber
drivers who might face serious hardships without the income they earn
through Uber.168 Airbnb landlords include those who need to rent out
rooms to guests in order to cover the cost of their housing, as well as welloff people who buy investment properties and rent them for profit.169 These
types of broad user bases can maximize a company’s chance of political
success. Further, companies that offer new ways of doing business, such as
platform companies, tend to benefit from the perception that they represent
the future of their industries, which adds a bit of a halo effect to their
appeal.170
B. LAW-RELATED FACTORS
The chance of successfully executing a regulatory entrepreneurship
strategy depends on a number of factors related to the law in question.
These relate to the kind and magnitude of regulatory uncertainty that the
entrepreneur is taking on.
One important factor is the penalty that the law imposes on violators.
For example, if the only penalty is a civil fine imposed on the corporation,
pushing the boundaries of the law may be an attractive prospect.171 If the
167. See Nancy Scola & Andrea Peterson, Data Is Uber’s Business. But Protecting It May Be Its
Biggest Weakness., WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2014), http://wapo.st/1t2rqBf. See generally VIKTOR
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM
HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013) (discussing “big data” collection, analysis, and use).
168. See Carolyn Said, Airbnb, Uber Cast Themselves as Saviors of the Middle Class, S.F.
CHRON. (Nov. 10, 2015, 8:16 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Airbnb-Uber-We-arethe-saviors-of-the-middle-6620729.php.
169. See id.; Adam Chandler, Is Airbnb a Credible Champion on Income Inequality?, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/airbnb-new-york/418272; Kessler,
supra note 166.
170. See, e.g., Adam Chandler, What Should the ‘Sharing Economy’ Really Be Called?,
ATLANTIC (May 27, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/05/sharing-economyairbnb-uber-yada/484505; Lobel, supra note 163, at 101–02.
171. See Wong, supra note 64 (“Moreover, if [a] business is not doing something morally
egregious (e.g. killing people) but simply violating the law in a somewhat more minor way, the officers
of the company bear little more risk than the company being sued out of existence, i.e. they bear little
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fine is low enough, the business may not even try to change the law and
instead might simply pay fines as they come up.172
On the other hand, if a law provides for the incarceration of the
executives of a company that violate it, that may deter the guerrilla growth
strategies that some modern regulatory entrepreneurs employ. For instance,
in some states, operating an unlicensed money transfer business is a felony
punishable by imprisonment and a criminal fine;173 this has tamped down
companies’ willingness to push the boundaries of mobile payment licensing
regimes.174
Moreover, a regulatory entrepreneur’s chance of successfully
changing a law may vary based on the public’s level of support for the law
in question. The more popular the law is, the more difficult it will likely be
to change it. Unpopular laws, in contrast, are more attractive targets for
regulatory entrepreneurship.
Relatedly, another key element is whether the law in question is
determined at the local, state, or national level. Change at the state and
local level is often possible more quickly than at the national level. This is
largely by design; the framers wanted to ensure that state governments
remained important centers of power and served as laboratories of
democracy and reform.175 The faster pace at which change is usually
possible at the state and local levels makes regulatory entrepreneurship
more feasible for startups with a limited “runway” of capital for
operations.176
Further, state and local political fights generally attract smaller
amounts of resources than national fights do.177 It takes less money to make
personal risk besides opportunity cost.” (emphasis added)).
172. Uber has operated by paying drivers’ fines in Paris, though this appears to be a temporary
measure. Alderman, supra note 66.
173. See Kevin V. Tu, Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 79–98, n.101
(2013) (examining the legal and regulatory landscape affecting emerging payment systems).
174. See id. at 109–13; Scheiber, supra note 70.
175. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.”).
176. See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 133, 151 (2014) (noting that startup companies typically refer to the “runway” of capital
they have raised for a certain period of operations).
177. See Election Overview, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/ (last visited
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waves in state and local politics; at the national level, even a significant
amount of money can be lost as a drop in the bucket. For example, consider
the 2013 mayoral race in New York City, the nation’s largest and
wealthiest city. Two months before the election, the New York Times
reported that, in the course of the campaign, the candidates had mustered a
combined total of approximately $35 million and spent about $30
million.178 In the 2014 New York gubernatorial campaign, the candidates
spent a combined total of approximately $55 million.179 In the 2012
presidential campaign, President Barack Obama and Mitt Romney’s
campaigns raised and spent roughly a billion dollars each;180 spending on
all federal elections in 2012 totaled approximately $7 billion.181 These
examples focus on political contributions and campaign spending, but our
broader point is that political efforts aimed at national-level change can be
prohibitively expensive.182
Another advantage of targeting state or local laws is the added
flexibility. The large number of state and local jurisdictions enables
companies to pick their battles in ways that increase their chances of
Mar. 17, 2017) (showing that the costs of federal congressional and presidential races in recent years
have been in the billions versus state contributions, each significantly less).
178. Matthew Bloch et al., How Much the N.Y.C. Mayoral Candidates Have Raised and Spent,
N.Y. TIMES, https://nyti.ms/131qG7W (last updated Sept. 2, 2013). These totals included potential
candidates who had not officially declared their candidacies, as well as money that a candidate
borrowed or transferred from another campaign. Id.
179. New York Gubernatorial and Lieutenant Gubernatorial Election, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/New_York_gubernatorial_and_lieutenant_gubernatorial_election,_2014
(last
visited Mar. 20, 2017).
180. Jeremy Ashkenas et al., The 2012 Money Race: Compare the Candidates, N.Y. TIMES,
http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). These numbers
include amounts raised by the candidates, the national party committees, and each candidate’s chief
Super PAC, but not other PACs or each candidate’s victory fund. Id.
181. Tarini Parti, FEC: $7B Spent on 2012 Campaign, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2013, 10:26 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/7-billion-spent-on-2012-campaign-fec-says-087051.
182. It is also worth noting that there are limits to what money can accomplish politically. Some
economists have argued that campaign spending is much less influential than the conventional wisdom
would dictate, see, e.g., Stephen J. Dubner, How Much Does Campaign Spending Influence the
Election? A Freakonomics Quorum, FREAKONOMICS (Jan. 17, 2012, 9:40 AM),
http://freakonomics.com/2012/01/17/how-much-does-campaign-spending-influence-the-election-afreakonomics-quorum, and some donors have lamented that they are unable to buy more influence, see,
e.g., Eliza Collins, Charles Koch Bemoans Lack of Influence Over 2016 Race, POLITICO (Jan. 8, 2016,
12:21
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/charles-koch-2016-presidential-race-217499;
Matthew Cooper, Koch Brothers Money Hasn’t Bought as Much As You Think, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 24,
2014, 12:36 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/05/02/koch-brothers-money-hasnt-bought-muchyou-think-248390.html. On the other hand, money clearly has some impact on elections, and donors
must have some reason for making the contributions that they do.
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success over time. The entrepreneur can start with the jurisdictions that it
finds most promising or hold off on pursuing a target until conditions are
favorable. It can decide to abandon a particular strategy, delay, or expand.
Moreover, the entrepreneur does not have to win every battle to achieve
some measure of success.183 These options are generally not available
when the law in question is national.184
Further, flexibility is useful because political environments fluctuate
over time, and changing political headwinds can make it easier or harder to
exert influence and alter the law. These fluctuations are driven by
economic and social conditions that are generally difficult or impossible to
deliberately influence. Similarly, politicians rise and fall. An entrepreneur
may benefit from the popular strength of a sympathetic official or the
weakness of an antagonistic one. For instance, in 2009, billionaire Michael
Bloomberg spent $102 million of his own money to help finance his
successful mayoral campaign.185 Non-billionaire Bill de Blasio spent about
one-tenth of that during his successful campaign four years later.186 If an
entrepreneur were looking to use its money to pressure the mayor’s office,
it might well find that its chances were better during the latter’s time in
office. Conversely, if the mayor’s office favored the entrepreneur’s
proposed change, acting earlier might have been preferable.
There are also tactics available at the state and local level that are not
available at the national level. For example, in 2014, Uber wanted to
operate in Portland but faced opposition from the city government.187 In
183. DraftKings and FanDuel are examples of this approach. They “have chosen which states to
operate in based on the individual rules in that state” and they have lost some battles, but continued
nonetheless with a larger strategy. Daniel Roberts, FanDuel, DraftKings File Lawsuits Against NY
Attorney General, FORTUNE (Nov. 13, 2015, 4:20 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/11/13/fandueldraftkings-lawsuits-schneiderman.
184. See, e.g., Nav Athwal, Fintech Startups Navigate Legal Gray Areas to Build Billion-Dollar
Companies, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 19, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/04/19/fintech-startupsnavigate-legal-gray-areas-to-build-billion-dollar-companies (describing how financial technology firms
have faced much greater barriers to innovation than companies like Airbnb and Uber have because the
former face significant federal regulation, while the latter do not).
185. Celeste Katz, Mayor Bloomberg Spent $102M on Campaign to Win Third Term - or $175
Per Vote, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 27, 2009, 9:24 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/mayorbloomberg-spent-102m-campaign-win-term-175-vote-article-1.414005.
186. See Michael Howard Saul, Here’s How Much Money Is in the Mayor’s New Campaign
Account, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2014/07/09/heres-howmuch-money-is-in-the-mayors-new-campaign-account (noting “de Blasio raised roughly $10.7 million,
received nearly $4 million in public funds and spent about $13.6 million”).
187. Weise, supra note 24.
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response, Uber began offering service in Vancouver, Washington, which is
a stone’s throw away from Portland, then sent the message “Hey Portland,
we are just across the river . . . .”188 Uber proceeded to begin offering
service in several adjacent suburbs of Portland.189 As Portland’s mayor
described the experience, “They basically forced their way into the market
and surrounded us, then put the pressure on for us to do likewise.”190 This
strategy, and others that rely on geographic proximity, are less likely to
work well when applied at the national level; it seems harder to imagine a
company pushing through a legal change in the United States on the
grounds that Canada and Mexico both adopted it.
And, because regulatory entrepreneurship is a form of politicking, it is
better-suited to the more political branches of government. An army of
users is more likely to be a compelling tool against executive and
legislative bodies than judicial ones. Judges are particularly unlikely to be
swayed by popular opinion if their terms are longer and if they are
appointed instead of elected.191 This further advantages state battles over
federal ones; in many states and cities, judges are elected, while judges in
federal district and appellate courts are appointed for life.192 On the other
hand, when a company finds itself in court, the longer that it can drag out
the proceeding, the more time it may have to grow its user base and
lobbying arm and push for a legal change.
For example, DraftKings and FanDuel had been operating in the
shadow of the law, each spending more than $100 million on television
advertising and signing up tens of thousands of users each day, before
receiving cease-and-desist orders from the New York state attorney
general.193 The attorney general wrote: “It is clear that DraftKings and
FanDuel are the leaders of a massive, multibillion-dollar scheme intended
188. Id.; Hey Portland, We Are Just Across the River . . . #WeWantUberPDX, UBER NEWSROOM,
https://newsroom.uber.com/pdx/hey-portland-we-are-just-across-the-river-wewantuberpdx (last updated
Dec. 7, 2015).
189. Weise, supra note 24.
190. Id.
191. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial
Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 9 (2003) (“In exercising judicial independence, the stakes for the
judges, that is, the loss of the judgeship, are clearly higher for judges with limited terms than they are
for appointed judges with life tenure.”); Judith Resnik, Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little
and Too Much, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 666–71 (1999).
192. See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 265 (2008)
(examining “elective versus nonelective judiciaries”).
193. Walt Bogdanich et al., Attorney General Tells DraftKings and FanDuel to Stop Taking
Entries in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2li5SHn; Natta, Jr., supra note 91.

422

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:383

to evade the law and fleece sports fans across the country.”194 Both
companies hired high-profile counsel and filed lawsuits seeking an
injunction against the cease-and-desist orders.195 Meanwhile, they
continued operating and rallying users to their cause.196 DraftKings filed a
petition against the attorney general, seeking to stop him “from carrying
out his threat to banish from this State a lawful industry beloved by
hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers.”197 The companies won this legal
battle out of court by securing legislation that made clear that their
businesses are legal.198
Many of the highest-profile companies that attempted a regulatory
entrepreneurship strategy and failed did so because they found themselves
fighting national laws in federal courts. One of the most famous examples
was Napster, the peer-to-peer file-sharing program.199 Many of the files
shared on Napster were copyrighted works, and the Recording Industry
Association of America sued Napster in federal court for contributory and
vicarious infringement of copyright.200 The suit brought Napster publicity
and further grew its user base, but this did not help Napster when it lost in
court.201 Napster was eventually forced into bankruptcy.202 Other
companies in the same space have encountered similar problems, including
Grokster, Kazaa, and Limewire.203
More recently, Aereo lost a high-profile Supreme Court case
regarding the legality of its business.204 Aereo provided its subscribers with
194. Bogdanich, supra note 193.
195. DraftKings retained David Boies, who represented Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election;
FanDuel hired Marc Zwillinger, a leading Internet lawyer who has represented clients in high-profile
litigation against the government. Roberts, supra note 183.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Drape, supra note 87. For a map of the legal status and legislative efforts concerning fantasy
sports betting, see Legislative Tracker: Daily Fantasy Sports, Sports Betting, supra note 91.
199. See Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 273–76
(2006) (recounting Napster’s history).
200. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
201. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).
202. In re Napster Copyright Litig. v. Hummer Windblad Venture Partners, No. C MDL 00-1369
MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30338, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2006).
203. Zittrain, supra note 199, at 286–93. See also JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS
THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 105–25 (2006) (discussing the file-sharing
movement); Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (2003) (same).
204. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014).
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broadcast network television content via streaming over the Internet.205
This raised questions of copyright infringement.206 Aereo attempted to
lobby the FCC and Congress for changes in the relevant laws and
regulations, both before and after it lost in court, but ultimately failed and
had to enter bankruptcy.207
Of course, there have been some regulatory entrepreneurs who have
succeeded with regulatory entrepreneurship strategies in federal court. In
the early days of videocassette recorders (“VCRs”), it was unclear whether
their use on copyrighted programming constituted copyright
infringement.208 If so, the manufacturers were potentially liable, and the
business model would not have been viable.209 However, the VCR
manufacturers successfully won in the Supreme Court, saving the
business.210
The early days of Federal Express provide another good example of a
company making its business viable by changing the law at the federal
level.211 Federal Express was founded in 1971, and in 1976 it began
actively lobbying for the deregulation of air cargo transport.212 It succeeded
in 1977—a rapid turnaround for a change in federal law.213 But in some
ways this example shows how rare this kind of success can be, as a number
of factors came together in ways that Federal Express could neither have
controlled nor predicted. First, Flying Tiger Line, Federal Express’s largest
competitor, completely changed its position on the existing statutory
205. Dan L. Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548–51 (2015)
(describing Aereo’s technology).
206. See id.
207. See In re Aereo, Inc., No. 14-13200-shl, 2014 WL 7721237 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). See
also Katy Bachman, Rockefeller Wants to Give Online Video Services Parity with Cable, ADWEEK
(Nov. 12, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/rockefeller-wants-give-onlinevideo-services-parity-cable-153795; Brian Fung, Aereo to the FCC: Let Us Join the Cable Companies
We Tried to Replace, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2014), http://wapo.st/1qUfTlG.
208. See Jessica Litman, Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 651, 666–67 (2015)
(describing how even after oral argument in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984), the majority of Supreme Court justices were initially inclined to affirm the Ninth
Circuit’s copyright infringement ruling).
209. See Litman, supra note 208, at 664 (noting that “Sony was making a significant amount of
money selling devices designed to copy copyrighted television programs” and describing this as “the
trumpet problem” of “making money because of works written by others”). See generally JAMES
LARDNER, FAST FORWARD (2002) (providing a history of VCRs).
210. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
211. For an excellent discussion of the Federal Express case, see generally Jill E. Fisch, How Do
Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005).
212. Id. at 1503–05, 1512–15.
213. Id. at 1515.
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regime and joined Federal Express in pushing for deregulation.214 This was
especially notable because the chair of the House Subcommittee on
Aviation, which had killed Federal Express’s prior attempts to change the
law, represented the district in which Flying Tiger’s headquarters were
located.215 Second, Federal Express benefited from a number of useful
allies—in particular, the chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the
regulatory body charged with overseeing Federal Express.216 This
confluence of factors is rare and generally beyond the control of the
regulatory entrepreneur.
C. THE PREVALENCE OF STARTUPS AS REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURS
Finally, in addition to the general business and law-related factors at
play, it seems significant, and not random, that startup companies represent
a large share of regulatory entrepreneurs. There are several reasons for
startups’ relative prevalence or edge over more established businesses in
the area of regulatory entrepreneurship.
First, by their nature, regulatory entrepreneurs are innovators. A large
body of literature examines startups and established companies’ relative
merits at fostering innovation and new technologies.217 There may be a
historical aspect to this narrative of innovation, as before 1980, fewer than
200 very large and established corporations accounted for most research
and development (“R&D”) in the United States.218 But since 1980, the
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 1514–16.
Id. at 1514.
Id. at 1513.
See, e.g., CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 45 (1997); CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 135–37 (2d ed. 1982); DANIEL F. SPULBER, THE INNOVATIVE
ENTREPRENEUR 78–122 (2014). See also generally Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, Innovation in
Large and Small Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 678 (1988); Joseph Bankman &
Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289 (1999); Janet E.L. Bercovitz et al., Firm
Capabilities and Managerial Decision Making: A Theory of Innovation Biases, in TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION: OVERSIGHTS AND FORESIGHTS (Raghu Garud et al. eds., 1997); Charles P. Himmelberg
& Bruce C. Petersen, R&D and Internal Finance: A Panel Study of Small Firms in High-Tech
Industries, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 38 (1994); Joshua Lerner, Small Businesses, Innovation, and Public
Policy, in ARE SMALL FIRMS IMPORTANT? THEIR ROLE AND IMPACT (Zoltan J. Acs ed., 1999);
Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 101
MICH. L. REV. 482 (2002). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against
Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 551–52 (1998) (finding that
numerous studies of innovation and small business are inconclusive).
218. Robert M. Hunt & Leonard I. Nakamura, The Democratization of U.S. Research and
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growth in private R&D in the U.S. economy is attributable to relatively
small and new companies.219
Second, as discussed in Part II, “guerilla growth” is one of the key
tactics that some regulatory entrepreneurs have deployed to become “too
big to ban” before regulators take action against them.220 The regulators’
timeline and policy agenda are difficult for an entrepreneur to control.
Thus, the success of this strategy hinges on the entrepreneur’s ability to
enter a market and grow rapidly. Silicon Valley startups, which are known
for trying to grow their user base as quickly as possible and to worry about
making money later, are well-positioned to take advantage of this tactic.221
For years, these startups have been pursuing businesses that did not have
well-established precedents. It was not always clear how these businesses
would monetize their user base. However, the industry consensus was that
(1) it would be possible to monetize the user base—that is, the business
would be profitable, one way or another—and (2) more users were
essential to the company’s long-term value. A list of examples in this vein
comes quickly to mind, such as YouTube,222 Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram.223 This created an environment in which industry executives
Development after 1980, at 8–9, fig.2 (Soc’y for Econ. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 121, 2006),
http://repec.org/sed2006/up.12143.1138646305.pdf.
219. Id. at 9. See also Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property
Law, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2008).
220. See Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401, 407 (2016)
(arguing for an experimentalist model of regulation because “agencies will often postpone regulation of
emerging risks as they wait to acquire more information,” and in the meantime “the political
environment for regulation may change”).
221. E.g., Matthew Braga, Twitter’s Road to IPO: Grow First, Monetize Later, FIN. POST (Sept.
13, 2013, 4:50 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/fp-tech-desk/twitters-road-to-ipo-grow-firstmonetize-later?__lsa=61db-bf2c (discussing companies like Twitter, Facebook, Dropbox, and Pinterest
that had a “grow first, monetize later” philosophy); Sarah Frier & Eric Newcomer, The Fuzzy, Insane
Math That’s Creating So Many Billion-Dollar Tech Companies, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2015, 9:00
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/the-fuzzy-insane-math-that-s-creating-somany-billion-dollar-tech-companies (noting how startup investors look to the number of users in
valuing the company and “salivate over what’s called ‘hockey-stick’ growth curves, indicating massive
uptake”); Nitasha Tiku, Look at How Quickly the Values of Multi-Billion-Dollar Startups Have
Multiplied, VERGE (Feb. 20, 2015, 5:11 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/2/20/8075053/look-athow-quickly-the-value-of-multi-billion-dollar-startups-have (“Build momentum now, figure out how to
make money later—otherwise, you’ll miss out on the next near-mythic exit.”).
222. E.g., Nicholas Jackson, Infographic: The History of Video Advertising on YouTube,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/infographic-thehistory-of-video-advertising-on-youtube/242836; Rolfe Winkler, YouTube: 1 Billion Viewers, No
Profit, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2015, 4:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/viewers-dont-add-up-toprofit-for-youtube-1424897967.
223. See Braga, supra note 221; David Holmes, Social Sites Have Found a New Monetization
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prioritized rapid user growth over profits.224 Over time, this produced an
increased focus on how to achieve rapid growth, which in turn led to the
development of people with expertise in how to accomplish this goal.225
By and large, many of these companies have become viewed as big
success stories.226 These successes have been supported by an ecosystem of
investors who are willing to accept large amounts of risk and
uncertainty,227 support growth-focused strategies, and take a relatively
long-term view. Angel investors, many of whom are successful exentrepreneurs, and the VC market make early-stage financing feasible for
high-risk, high-return businesses.228 Most angel investors like being
Strategy and It Leaves Indie Creators out in the Cold, PANDO (Feb. 13, 2015), https://pando.com/2015/
02/13/social-sites-have-found-a-new-monetization-strategy-and-it-leaves-indie-creators-out-in-the-cold
(discussing the history of monetizing online technology).
224. See Frier & Newcomer, supra note 221 (noting that a “tech startup’s cash flow is less
important than you might think,” but investors “look to find the number of people using the product,
regardless of whether they pay for it”); Eric Kutcher et al., Grow Fast or Die Slow, MCKINSEY & CO.
(Apr.
2014),
http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/grow-fast-or-die-slow
(“Growth trumps all.”); Claire Cain Miller, Popularity or Income? Two Sites Fight It Out, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2008), https://nyti.ms/2nEHtx2 (discussing several high-profile tech startups that succeeded
with a strategy of prioritizing user growth rather than profits); Dan Primack, Tech IPOs: Profits Don’t
Matter, FORTUNE (Mar. 26, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/03/26/tech-ipos-profits-dont-matter (noting
that “profits don’t really matter when it comes to tech IPOs” and “[t]oday’s IPO buyers care about two
key metrics: (1) Growth. (2) Total available market, into which that growth can be realized”).
225. See Laura K. Inamedinova, 20 Growth-Hacking Strategists You Should Follow in 2016,
FORBES (Aug. 7, 2016, 10:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/laura-inamedinova/2016/08/07/20growth-hacking-strategists-that-you-must-follow-in-2016 (listing “growth hacking” experts).
226. The companies are viewed as success stories because they succeeded in becoming profitable,
were purchased by other companies at large valuations, or conducted successful initial public offerings.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 224 (“Successes like YouTube, the online video site sold to Google for
$1.65 billion in 2006, convinced some venture investors that building a Web site with a large number of
users could still be more valuable than making money from paying customers.”); Larry Popelka, What
We Learned from Twitter’s IPO: The Value of Innovation Is at an All-Time High, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
18, 2013, 11:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-11-18/what-we-learned-fromtwitter-s-ipo-the-value-of-innovation-is-at-an-all-time-high (noting that Twitter had a successful IPO,
based not on profit, but on the value of its innovation).
227. Legal risks are just one of many types of bet-the-company risks that startup companies may
be facing. See Thomas Oppong, The 10 Biggest Risks That Prevent VCs from Funding Your Startup,
ALL TOP STARTUPS (Aug. 27, 2014), http://alltopstartups.com/2014/08/27/biggest-startup-risks (noting
venture capitalist Marc Andreessen listed the following as risks that will cause potential investors to
decide not to invest: founder risk, market risk, competition risk, timing risk, financing risk, marketing
risk, technology risk, product risk, hiring risk, and location risk); Sreekanth Ravi, When Launching
Your Startup, Consider These 5 Risks, ENTREPRENEUR (May 21, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/234094 (discussing product risk, market risk, financial risk, team risk, and execution risk).
228. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons From the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1068–69 (2003); Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling
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involved in exciting new ventures, particularly those with the potential to
disrupt entire industries.229 Thus, startup investors are often willing to focus
on rapid user growth while taking the long view of companies’ prospects
for profitability.230
Third, changing the law is a highly uncertain proposition, and startups
may be more inclined to take on this uncertainty.231 Politics is a
complicated arena with many competing interest groups and variables. It is
difficult to predict whether an attempt to change the law will succeed, or
what unintended consequences it might produce, on the legal system or
otherwise. Startups without established businesses have little to lose
economically from such shakeups.232 Culturally, startups often pride
themselves on being disruptive and changing the world; startup employees
tend to view these shakeups optimistically.233 One prevalent cliché about
startups, sometimes mocked in popular culture, is that they attract people
who “want to make the world a better place.”234 Startup entrepreneurs are
“socialized to believe that most problems can be fixed with enough money
and engineering.”235 Furthermore, startup culture, particularly in Silicon
Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1416–20 (2008).
229. See Ibrahim, supra note 228, at 1412, 1419.
230. For example, it has taken Airbnb years to reach profitability, and Uber—whose valuation of
nearly $70 billion makes it the world’s most valuable private startup—reportedly incurred multi-billion
dollar losses in 2016. Eric Newcomer, Uber, Lifting Financial Veil, Says Sales Growth Outpaces
Losses, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2017, 12:03 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0414/embattled-uber-reports-strong-sales-growth-as-losses-continue; Brad Stone & Olivia Zaleski, Airbnb
Enters
the
Land
of
Profitability,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
26,
2017,
9:00
AM),
ttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/airbnb-enters-the-land-of-profitability.
231. For a classic work that defines uncertainty and argues that it is entrepreneurs’ willingness to
take on uncertainty that gives rise to profit, see FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT
20, 232 (1921).
232. See Barry & Caron, supra note 62, at 74 n.22 (“[I]ndustries with new business models
sometimes have incentives to push the regulatory envelope.”).
233. Indeed, the term “disruptive” has become so overused in Silicon Valley that some companies
have started consciously avoiding it. See Emily Inverso, The Most Obnoxious and Overused Startup
Jargon, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2015, 10:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/emilyinverso/2015/03/16/themost-obnoxious-and-overused-startup-jargon; Max Nisen, How ‘Disrupt’ Got Turned into an Overused
Buzzword, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2013, 6:27 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-siliconvalley-killed-disruption-2013-9. The terminology originally came from Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M.
Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 44.
234. See, e.g., Sam Biddle, TechCrunch Speaker Combines Every Possible Startup Cliché,
VALLEYWAG (May 6, 2014, 11:51 AM), http://valleywag.gawker.com/techcrunch-speaker-combinesevery-possible-startup-clic-1572438546; Adam Levene, Beyond Disruption: The Age of the Impact
Entrepreneur, WIRED (Oct. 2014), http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/10/the-age-of-the-impactentrepreneur.
235. Brian Fung, The Real World Is Undermining Silicon Valley’s Apolitical Fantasyland, WASH.
POST (Aug. 20, 2014), http://wapo.st/1nauI2B.
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Valley, has become known to foster a certain libertarian-leaning, freemarket ideology that views technology that appeals to the masses as
democratic.236 Given this confluence of factors, it is not surprising that
startups might be inclined to start a line of business fraught with legal
uncertainty.
Established companies, almost by definition, have stable, profitable
businesses. This gives them reason to worry about radical changes to the
law that might undermine or even eliminate those businesses; no one wants
to kill the golden goose in attempt to get more eggs. Moreover, a new and
uncertain line of business will demand a large amount of managers’ finite
attention, which can detract from the company’s already-developed
business lines. Established companies might also be dissuaded from
pivoting their business models to ones that require regulatory
entrepreneurship because they fear the bad press that might come from
being seen as operating in a legal gray area or breaking the law. More
generally, established businesses and customer relations require a certain
degree of stability and predictability. They tend to be larger and thus have
more levels of internal hierarchy. They tend to attract employees who
prefer the more stable prospects that come from working at an established
business instead of high-risk, high-reward startup employment.
Despite these obstacles, established companies are capable of
engaging in regulatory entrepreneurship as well. Google is perhaps the best
example. Its founders have remained committed to taking on big and
complex problems and applying creative solutions, and warned prospective
IPO investors that Google would continue to take on moonshot projects
after it went public.237 One of the company’s most important moonshot
236. Paul Bradley Carr, Travis Shrugged: The Creepy, Dangerous Ideology Behind Silicon
Valley’s Cult of Disruption, PANDO (Oct. 24, 2012), https://pando.com/2012/10/24/travis-shrugged
(“To proponents of Disruption, the free market is king, and regulation is always the enemy.”); Gregory
Ferenstein, Silicon Valley Represents an Entirely New Political Category, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 8,
2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/11/08/silicon-valley-represents-an-entirely-new-political-category
(noting that author conducted a political psychology study of the tech industry and “[t]he results suggest
that Internet startup founders represent an entirely distinct, libertarian-like ideology within the
Democratic party. . . . Tech startup founders see the government as an investor in citizens, rather than as
a protector from capitalism”); Fung, supra note 235 (“A belief in permissionless innovation is what
gives the tech industry its libertarian streak.”).
237. 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter, ALPHABET: INVESTOR REL., https://abc.xyz/investor/foundersletters/2004/ipo-letter.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2017) (“We will not shy away from high-risk, highreward projects because of short term earnings pressure. . . . Do not be surprised if we place smaller
bets in areas that seem very speculative or even strange when compared to our current businesses.”).
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investments is the self-driving car project.238 Since the beginning of the
project, it was clear that Google would have to change the law for its selfdriving car business to be viable. To date, Google is one of the leaders in
self-driving car technology and has persuaded several states to pass laws
that allow public road testing.239
Yet Google, in some ways, illustrates why regulatory entrepreneurs
tend to be startups. Though now a well-established company, Google began
as a startup that experienced tremendous success, and its startup culture
persists, at least in part. Further, Google’s founders put in place a dual-class
stock structure which guaranteed that they would retain control of the
company and could not be forced to change course by dissatisfied outside
investors.240 This structure, combined with the market’s perception that
they are visionary tech leaders who deserve some operational deference,
gives Google significant freedom to engage in regulatory entrepreneurship,
as well as take on other types of risky projects.
Google investors nonetheless became increasingly uneasy about both
the amount and opacity of Google’s spending on far-out technology
projects that were unrelated to its core business of advertising and
search.241 As a former Google executive described: “It was getting harder
and harder to hide the costs of some of the company’s projects,” especially
as some of these speculative ventures were bound to fail, and noted that
“[i]t’s easier to take the core business and run it like a Fortune 500
company.”242 Google responded to mounting investor pressure by
restructuring itself as a holding company, Alphabet, Inc., with a host of
subsidiaries.243 Under the new structure, the moonshot technology projects
238. Steven Levy, Google’s Larry Page on Why Moon Shots Matter, WIRED (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:30
AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/01/ff-qa-larry-page.
239. E.g., Dino Grandoni, Among the States, Self-Driving Cars Have Ignited a Gold Rush, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2mdRctS; Alex Knapp, Nevada Passes Law Authorizing
Driverless Cars, FORBES (June 22, 2011, 5:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2011/06/
22/nevada-passes-law-authorizing-driverless-cars.
240. Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 849,
900 (2012); Steven Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2012, 9:17 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-classgives-google-founders-tighter-control; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Thorny Side Effects in Silicon Valley
Tactic to Keep Control, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 3, 2013, 5:16 PM), https://nyti.ms/2nEOEFp.
241. See Alistair Barr & Rolfe Winkler, Google Creates Parent Company Called Alphabet in
Restructuring, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2015, 8:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-creates-newcompany-alphabet-1439240645.
242. Id.
243. See Larry Page, Larry’s Alphabet Letter, ALPHABET (Aug. 10, 2015), https://abc.xyz/
investor/founders-letters/2015/index.html#2015-larry-alphabet-letter.
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are partitioned into a separate subsidiary, X, framed as Alphabet’s
incubator.244 The projects that turn into viable businesses are spun off or
“graduate” as their own standalone companies,245 such as the self-driving
car project that became Waymo.246
IV. THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
In this final Part, we explore how regulatory entrepreneurship will
likely continue to shape our laws in the years to come.
A. THE PROSPECTS FOR REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP GOING
FORWARD
The factors that we examined in Part III offer insight into the likely
prevalence of regulatory entrepreneurship going forward.
Anticipating the law-related factors necessarily means making some
predictions about the course of politics and future policy making, which is
a difficult prospect at best. We simply note that the political environment at
the national level is highly polarized, and many issues are left to state and
local governments to address.247 This could produce a fertile legal
landscape for regulatory entrepreneurship.248
Similarly, future prospects for regulatory entrepreneurship will depend
on the health of the ecosystem that supports and promotes startups. A
mature industry has arisen around providing startups with capital; this has
come with infrastructure—such as people with experience evaluating
startup investment opportunities—that is likely to prove durable.249
244. Mark Bergen, Google X Has a New Logo and New Plan to Turn Moonshots into Actual
Businesses, RECODE (Jan. 13, 2016, 3:30 AM), http://recode.net/2016/01/13/google-x-has-a-new-logoand-new-plan-to-turn-moonshots-into-actual-businesses/.
245. See Barr & Winkler, supra note 241.
246. Waymo, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (“The
Google self-driving car project is now Waymo. . . . We are a self-driving technology company with a
mission to make it safe and easy for people and things to move around.”).
247. See generally PEW RES. CTR., PARTISAN POLARIZATION SURGES IN BUSH, OBAMA YEARS
(June 4, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/06/04/partisan-polarization-surges-in-bush-obamayears/ (discussing upward trend in political polarization); PEW RES. CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN
THE AMERICAN PUBLIC (June 12, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarizationin-the-american-public/ (same).
248. See supra Part III.B.
249. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 728
(2010); Press Release, Pew Res. Ctr. & Nat’l Venture Cap. Ass’n, $58.8 Billion in Venture Capital
Invested Across U.S. in 2015, According to the MoneyTree Report (Jan. 15, 2016), http://nvca.org/
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Venture capital is a crucial part of the ecosystem, but it includes other
participants as well, such as angel investors, accelerators, and incubators.250
In addition, recent legal changes have opened up new avenues for
investment in startups.251 Also, importantly, investors have become
increasingly comfortable with regulatory entrepreneurship as a business
strategy, and political strategy firms have emerged that focus on helping
startups navigate legislative and regulatory hurdles.252 This assembled
infrastructure will facilitate regulatory entrepreneurship on an ongoing
basis.
But perhaps the most important factors for the future of regulatory
entrepreneurship are business-related. As noted previously, the growth of
platform companies has been a significant driver of increased regulatory
entrepreneurship. One might therefore expect that the prospects for
regulatory entrepreneurship are tied, at least in part, to the fate of new
platform companies.
As discussed in Part III, large, connected user bases and significant
amounts of capital are both important for regulatory entrepreneurship:
Skillful use of a large, connected user base has become arguably the most
effective weapon in the modern regulatory entrepreneur’s arsenal. Money
is also important—companies that can credibly threaten to commit lots of
resources to political battles, and to be able to stay in the game for the long
haul, are more likely to succeed than those that cannot.253
There are some reasons to think that new platform companies may
pressreleases/58-8-billion-in-venture-capital-invested-across-u-s-in-2015-according-to-the-moneytreereport-2/.
250. See generally Brad Bernthal, Investment Accelerators, 21 STANFORD J.L. BUS. & FIN. 139
(2016); Ibrahim, supra note 228; Dana Thompson, Accelerating the Growth of the Next Generation of
Innovators, 8 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 379 (2013).
251. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV.
561, 562 (2015); Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit
Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html.
252. For example, well-known lobbyist Bradley Tusk has started his own firm, Tusk Strategies,
that has helped startups such as Uber and FanDuel launch campaigns and manage the regulatory
process, and even accepts payment in equity. Navigating the Political Climate in NYC and Beyond for
Uber, TUSK STRATEGIES: CASE STUDIES, http://tuskstrategies.com/case-studies/uber (last visited Mar.
19, 2017); Stephanie Mehta, Meet Uber’s Political Genius, VANITY FAIR (Jun. 17, 2016, 10:24 AM),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/06/bradley-tusk-fanduel-uber. For a discussion of how people
with political expertise and government connections have flowed into the startup ecosystem, see
Elizabeth Pollman, The Rise of Regulatory Affairs in Innovative Startups, in THE HANDBOOK ON LAW
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (D. Gordon Smith & Christine Hurt eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press, forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880818.
253. See, e.g., DRUTMAN, supra note 9, at 238; Helderman, supra note 81.
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struggle to acquire the requisite user bases and capital. One issue that
platform companies face is that they are, by their nature, middlemen who
profit from facilitating transactions between other parties. Consequently,
those parties have an incentive to try and cut the platform company out of
the transaction.254 In many instances, this may be achievable.255
Circumvention is generally a manageable problem for Airbnb and Uber
because of the nature of their underlying businesses. Travelers usually go
to different places over time, so they cannot simply reuse the same Airbnb
host over and over. Uber passengers usually want to find the driver closest
to their location at the moment they need a ride. This is not easy to do
without their app. There are other platform companies whose business
models provide similar safeguards against being easily circumvented.256
But, for many platform companies, this is a major issue that can greatly
undermine the user base and financial resources that the company needs to
be politically effective.257 Furthermore, even if a new platform company
did not suffer from circumvention issues, regulatory entrepreneurship will
only be appealing if there is a potentially changeable law that materially
affects the value of the business. Combined, this would seem to suggest
that only a narrow range of businesses stand to gain from a regulatory
entrepreneurship strategy.
However, we believe that there is an even stronger argument that the
business fundamentals favor increased regulatory entrepreneurship in the
years to come. This argument is sometimes referred to as the “second half
of the chessboard” argument.258 The name comes from a legend in which a
254. Cf. Jordan M. Barry et al., Coasean Keep-Away: Voluntary Transaction Costs (San Diego
Legal Studies Paper No. 14-149, 2014) (giving a similar example in more detail).
255. For example, imagine a platform that connects people who need haircuts to stylists, similar to
Glamsquad or StyleBee. The stylist and customer, once they have been introduced, can easily contact
each other to conduct future business without going through the platform.
256. For example, companies whose users cannot rely on past matches in the future may be
difficult to circumvent. See, e.g., Semil Shah, Iterations: Lessons We Can Draw from Cherry,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 13, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/13/iterations-lessons-we-can-draw-fromcherry (discussing Cherry, which allowed users to call someone nearby to clean their car). Companies
that provide another service besides matching—such as DraftKings and FanDuel, which adjudicate the
daily fantasy contests players enter—also have added protection.
257. See, for example, Zeel (provides massage therapists); Your-Mechanic (sends mechanics);
TutorSpree (connected people with tutors, but now defunct); Urban-sitter (sends babysitters); Washio
(laundry pick-up and delivery); DogVacay (pet-sitting services); Instacart (grocery shopping services);
BloomThat (flower delivery); Pager (doctors); Glamsquad (hair and makeup stylists); Eaze (medical
marijuana delivery).
258. ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS,
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king promises the inventor of chess a reward for his great invention. The
inventor asks for a grain of rice to be placed on the first square of a
chessboard; then two grains on the second square the next day; four grains
on the third square the day after; eight grains on the fourth square the day
after that, and so on, doubling the previous day’s total each day until the
sixty-fourth day. Only later does the king realize that he has promised the
inventor more rice than has been produced in the history of the world and
bankrupted his kingdom.259
Like the grains of rice on the chessboard, technological progress has
exhibited exponential growth.260 This has been particularly true of the
computer industry; for the last fifty years, computer technology has
doubled in power approximately every two years.261 This is sometimes
referred to as Moore’s law, after the author of the paper that first predicted
this pattern.262 Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to wrap
one’s head around this meteoric growth; many individuals now carry more
computing power in their pockets than NASA possessed at the time of the
moon landing.263 Assuming that Moore’s law continues to hold,264 the next
few years will add more computing power than the past fifty years,
combined—and then the next few years will add much more still. And,
even if technological progress slows significantly, we are still likely to see
tremendous increases in computing power in the next few years.
It is hard to predict exactly how all of this additional computing power will
AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 39–47 (2014).

259. Accounts differ as to whether, upon this discovery, the king rewards the inventor for his
cleverness by making him a high-ranking advisor, or executes him for tricking the king. See
BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, supra note 258, at 45–47; MALBA TAHAN, THE MAN WHO COUNTED: A
COLLECTION OF MATHEMATICAL ADVENTURES 113–15 (1993).
260. This is because technological gains feed into each other, so that today’s gains lead to greater
gains in the future.
261. More precisely, the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit has doubled
approximately every two years. Thomas L. Friedman, Moore’s Law Turns 50, N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2015), https://nyti.ms/2jAv7ns.
262. See Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS
MAG., April 19, 1965, at 4. Gordon E. Moore is the founder of Intel.
263. See, e.g., A Modern Smartphone or a Vintage Supercomputer: Which Is More Powerful?,
PHONEARENA (June 14, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://www.phonearena.com/news/A-modern-smartphone-ora-vintage-supercomputer-which-is-more-powerful_id57149 (quoting physicist Michio Kaku).
264. There have been many predictions that Moore’s law will fail over the last fifty years. To date,
they have all proved wrong. For example, Gordon Moore himself predicted in 1995 that Moore’s law
would not hold after 2005. He then updated his prediction in 2005, predicting that it would last until
between 2015 and 2025. In 2015, he updated once again, saying that it would end in 2025. See The End
of Moore’s Law, ECONOMIST (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economistexplains/2015/04/economist-explains-17 (collecting these and other examples).
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be used.265 However, it seems a safe bet that we will be increasingly
connected and accessible, which will give companies new ways to mobilize
large groups of people on their behalf. Companies are also likely to have
more data about their users and greater ability to organize and analyze this
information.266 This will make companies better able to channel and
leverage their users for maximum effect. All of this suggests that regulatory
entrepreneurship will be an increasingly attractive proposition, and that we
will therefore see more of it, even if we cannot quite anticipate the exact
form that it is likely to take.
B. HOW REGULATORY ENTREPRENEURSHIP WILL AFFECT THE LAW
Because regulatory entrepreneurship may become an increasingly
common phenomenon, we believe that its effects on lawmaking merit
careful consideration. We begin with a discussion of scholarly accounts of
the political process and how they relate to regulatory entrepreneurship
generally. We then turn to some well-known political pathologies and
consider the extent to which regulatory entrepreneurship might ameliorate
them. Finally, we consider the limits of regulatory entrepreneurship’s
potential to improve political outcomes and assess its likely effects overall.
1. Companies as Drivers of Political Change
The democratic political process involves a messy, complicated
interplay of different groups of people pursuing varied goals. Changing the
law often requires action by multiple interest groups with divergent goals.
This raises the question of how these groups coordinate their efforts. As
one scholar put it, while both bootleggers and Baptists were influential in
bringing about laws restricting liquor sales, “[i]t seems unlikely that the
local Baptist preacher and the moonshiners meet in someone’s parlor to
discuss banning Sunday [liquor] sales.”267 Other individuals or institutions
must act as intermediaries and coalition-builders, knitting together support
from disparate groups in order to accomplish legal change.268
265. See, e.g., Daniel Burrus, The Internet of Things Is Far Bigger Than Anyone Realizes, WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
266. See generally MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 167.
267. Randy T. Simmons et al., Bootleggers, Baptists, and Political Entrepreneurs: Key Players in
the Rational Game and Morality Play of Regulatory Politics, 15 INDEP. REV. 367, 368 (2011).
268. Sociologists Neil Fligstein and Douglas McAdam have theorized the nature of social change,
from political movements to market meltdowns, and have included the idea of “internal governance
units” which they define as organizations or associations who play a connecting role with state actors
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The dominant view is that, historically, politicians, and occasionally
high-ranking bureaucrats, have taken on this role.269 Such politicians are
sometimes described as “political entrepreneurs.”270
Regulatory entrepreneurs have some similarities to political
entrepreneurs, but they differ in several key ways. First, political
entrepreneurs usually take advantage of preexisting, organized interest
groups.271 Modern regulatory entrepreneurs, in contrast, have largely
identified unorganized groups and mobilized them.272 “People for
Deregulated Taxicabs,” “People for Short-Term Rentals,” and “Citizens
Against Car Dealerships” were not established political groups that adopted
the cause of Uber, Airbnb, and Tesla; instead, these companies organized
people who were sympathetic to these positions and mobilized them to take
action.
Second, political entrepreneurs have usually been motivated by
values-based preferences, rooted in ideology or otherwise, for particular
policies or by advancing their political careers. Regulatory entrepreneurs,
in contrast, are primarily motivated by the desire to earn profits.
Third, while political entrepreneurs are individuals, usually elected
officials,273 regulatory entrepreneurs are primarily privately owned
businesses. One key implication of this pertains to how policies spread
across jurisdictions.
Because of the structure of the U.S. political system, politicians
usually have bases of support centered in particular geographic areas. A
mayor is well equipped to influence policy in her city, but her network
strength is unlikely to reach other jurisdictions. It is true that successful
and who provide information to actors within a “strategic action field.” NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUGLAS
MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS 77 (2012).
269. Simmons et al., supra note 267, at 368–69.
270. See, e.g., id.; LEADERSHIP AND INNOVATION: A BIOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ON
ENTREPRENEURS IN GOVERNMENT 8 (Jameson W. Doig & Erwin C. Hargrove eds., 1987). The term is
also sometimes used to refer to businesses that pursue a rent-seeking strategy. See, e.g., Matthew
McCaffrey & Joseph T. Salerno, A Theory of Political Entrepreneurship, 2 MOD. ECON. 552, 553–54
(2011).
271. Simmons et al., supra note 267, at 373.
272. Justin Fox, Uber Is Lobbying for All of Us, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 29, 2015, 12:06 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-29/uber-s-nationwide-army-of-lobbyists-serves-thepublic-interest.
273. Mark Schneider & Paul Teske, Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence
from Local Government, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 737, 737 (1992) (“Existing studies of political
entrepreneurship . . . tend to focus on high-level bureaucrats in governmental or quasi-governmental
agencies . . . or on dynamic politicians.”).
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mayors often attempt to parlay that success into election to statewide
office, and successful state politicians often attempt to parlay that success
into national political office.274 However, the positions available at higher
levels of government are structurally limited—the number of governors,
members of Congress, and Presidents are fixed—which constrains the
amount of movement that can occur up the chain, especially when
incumbents’ well-documented electoral advantages are taken into
account.275 Moreover, in our federalist system, different levels of
government have dominion over different questions. Thus, many issues that
a mayor might build a coalition around do not translate to state politics; the
same issue applies for state politicians moving to the national political
arena. Furthermore, politicians in the United States generally do not move
among parallel levels of government; a successful mayor of San Diego is
not likely to run for mayor of Los Angeles, or to move from being governor
of one state to another.276
Businesses, in contrast, are not constrained in the same ways. The
number of businesses of a particular size or operating in a given industry is
not intrinsically fixed. More importantly, businesses are focused on
growing their customer bases geographically in a way that politicians
generally are not. Thus, a business that succeeds in establishing a winning
electoral coalition that works at the city level in San Diego is much more
likely to try to repeat its success in Los Angeles, or from one state to
another.
Taken together, these differences suggest that regulatory
entrepreneurship will lead to different coalitions being formed, and
therefore different laws being enacted, than has been the case historically.
Regulatory entrepreneurship seems most likely to have the largest effect on
policymaking at the local and state level and to feature groups that are not
currently as organized in American politics.
274. Martin O’Malley, for example, was elected Mayor of Baltimore, then Governor of Maryland,
then unsuccessfully sought the Democratic Party nomination for President. Juana Summers, Baltimore
Launched Martin O'Malley, Then Weighed Him Down, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 3, 2015, 5:03 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/08/03/428159933/baltimore-launched-martin-omalleythen-weighed-him-down.
275. See, e.g., Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S.
House Elections Grow?, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 478, 480–82 (1996).
276. See Bill Federer, Only Man Ever Elected Governor of 2 States, WORLD NET DAILY (Oct. 21,
2015, 9:54 PM), http://www.wnd.com/2015/10/only-man-ever-elected-governor-of-2-states.
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2. Potential Benefits to the Political Process
Every political process is imperfect,277 and ours is no exception.
Scholars have documented a number of pathologies that can lead to
inefficient outcomes.278 One common circumstance in which the political
process can produce suboptimal outcomes is when there are asymmetries
between how a policy’s costs and benefits are distributed.
For example, consider a policy that produces concentrated benefits but
diffuse costs—that is, it provides significant benefits to a relatively small
group of people, while imposing relatively small costs on each member of a
large group of people. In such circumstances, the beneficiaries of the
proposed policy have a lot of incentive to fight for that policy.279 On the
other hand, each of those who would be hurt by the policy has little
incentive to resist it, since she would suffer only a small loss if it were
enacted.280 These asymmetric incentives can result in the policy being
enacted, even if the policy inflicts more aggregate harm to those hurt by it
than it benefits the policy’s proponents.281
A number of policy areas embody this dynamic. Many involve
incumbent members of an industry using legal restrictions to exclude
potential competitors.282 This reduced competition enables the incumbent
firms to charge higher prices, which can significantly raise their profits.283
Moreover, the incumbent firms are often organized into a trade association
and, in some instances, a handful of firms may account for a large portion
277. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 97–100 (2d ed. 1970).
According to Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem, there are no procedures for collective or social ordering
of alternative choices that satisfy reasonable assumptions concerning the autonomy of the people and
the rationality of their preferences. As such, there is no perfect set of decisionmaking processes or
institutions. WILLIAM ROBERTS CLARK ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 11 (2d ed.
2013).
278. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 63–68, 197–99, 273–76 (1962); MANCUR
OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1–4
(1965); GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 221–24 (1965); Anne O. Krueger, The
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 301–03 (1974); Fred S.
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 101, 106–09 (1987); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224, 228–29 (1967).
279. MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 165–67 (1977).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 10–11.
283. Id.
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of total market share.284 This gives them strong incentive to push for these
policies and makes collective action easier.285 At the same time, the
increased costs are spread over a large group of consumers as well as
would-be competitors.286 This gives each of the policy’s natural opponents
little incentive to lobby against it and makes it difficult to organize and
coordinate opponents’ efforts.287
One of the best-known ways in which incumbents enact protectionist
legislation is occupational licensing—regulations that require individuals to
obtain a government license or other official permission to pursue a
particular vocation or profession. Occupational licensing requirements have
expanded dramatically in the last sixty years; in 1950, fewer than 5% of
Americans worked in jobs that required licenses, versus more than 30%
today.288 Clearly, occupational licensing can be useful;289 few people favor
abandoning all licensing for surgeons or architects, for example. But many
commentators have questioned the rationale for licensing occupations such
as auctioneers, boxing timekeepers, and hair braiders.290 Furthermore,
securing these licenses can be extremely costly; for example, in some
states, braiding hair for money requires years of classes and thousands of
dollars in tuition.291
Overly protectionist occupational licensing has many problems. It
makes it harder for workers to shift between industries, fueling
unemployment. It makes products and services more expensive for
consumers and harder to obtain. Yet despite derision by politicians on both
284. Id. at 141–48.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 165–67.
287. Id.
288. Jacob Goldstein, So You Think You Can Be a Hair Braider?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 12,
2012), http://nyti.ms/Lm66UT; Robert Litan, In Obama’s Budget, an Effort to Rein in Occupational
Licensing, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2015, 11:16 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/02/09/inobamas-budget-an-effort-to-rein-in-occupational-licensing.
289. Consumers may not be well equipped to evaluate the quality of certain specialized fields, and
the cost of incompetence may be high.
290. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 288; Matthew Yglesias, Bill Callegari Trying to Trim
Occupational Licensing in Texas, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Dec. 7, 2012, 12:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/moneybox/2012/12/07/texas_occupational_licensing_state_rep_bill_callegari_aims_to_deregulat
e.html.
291. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 288 (discussing one would-be hair braider’s experience in
Utah, which requires “nearly two years of school and $16,000 in tuition”); BRAIDING FREEDOM,
http://braidingfreedom.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2017) (discussing similar rules in Washington,
Missouri, and Arkansas, among other states).
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sides of the aisle,292 these rules have proliferated because of their
asymmetric benefits.293 Regulated groups fight vigorously to get and keep
their protections, but most voters pay little attention to these issues;
elections rarely turn on the rules that govern opticians, interior designers, or
athletes’ agents.294
But regulatory entrepreneurship has made some inroads where more
traditional politics has not. Restrictive taxicab regulations endured for
decades nationwide, but Uber (and its competitor Lyft) has transformed the
landscape in a short amount of time. For example, in the last seventy-five
years, New York City increased its cab fleet by only a thousand, increasing
from approximately 12,000 cab medallions to 13,000.295 In just four years
in New York City, Uber added almost 12,000 new for-hire cars to the city’s
streets.296 Uber has had significant effects on taxi regulations in many other
cities as well.297
State laws requiring car manufacturers to sell through independent
dealers are another form of entry restrictions or protectionism that have
proved similarly durable, withstanding several efforts from the big car
companies to repeal them.298 But in just a decade, Tesla Motors has made
real inroads against these laws, including convincing several states to pass
292. In 2015, President Obama proposed spending $15 million to study the effects of occupational
licensing, to applause from both the left and the right. See Litan, supra note 288; Carrie Sheffield, How
Cutting Red Tape Helps Low-Income Families, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2015, 8:43 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/carriesheffield/2015/02/02/can-cutting-red-tape-generate-200b-for-lowincome-families; Nick Timiraos, White House Warns States On Job-Licensing Requirements, WALL ST.
J. (July 30, 2015, 7:44 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/07/30/need-a-license-for-that-jobthe-white-house-warns-states-against-overdoing-it.
293. Timiraos, supra note 292.
294. See Edward J. Timmons & Anna Mills, Short-Sighted Policy, U.S. NEWS: ECON.
INTELLIGENCE (Feb. 17, 2015, 1:45 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/
02/17/occupational-licensing-is-short-sighted-hurts-low-income-workers; Matthew Yglesias, The
Trouble with State Government, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 28, 2009), http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/
2009/02/28/191948/the_trouble_with_state_government (“[T]he lack of public attention paid to
policymaking at the state, county, and municipal level leads to much more pure interest-group capture
than you see on the federal level. . . . At the state level, bad policy really runs amok.”).
295. Ginia Bellafante, Uber Makes Its Pain New Yorkers’ Problem, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1Is5SuR.
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., Matthew Mitchell & Michael Farren, A Common-Sense Solution to the Uber vs.
Taxi Wars, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1119mitchell-farren-uber-taxis-deregulate-20151118-story.html (noting that some Florida counties have
created a single set of regulations that apply equally to taxis and ride-share companies).
298. Crane, supra note 13, at 12; Death of a Car Salesman, supra note 45.
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new legislation that allows direct sales of automobiles to consumers.299
There are many other examples of regulatory entrepreneurs taking on
licensing regimes. State laws generally specify that only licensed
optometrists and ophthalmologists are permitted to issue eyeglass and
contact lens prescriptions. Opternative, a recent telemedicine startup,
partially subverts this model: It offers free online eye examinations. If they
wish, users can then pay an ophthalmologist (through the site) to examine
the results of the examination and other medical information and provide a
prescription for eyeglasses, contact lenses, or both. Opternative has been
subject to aggressive pushback from optometric organizations, which favor
in-person examinations in licensed optometrists’ offices; the fight remains
ongoing as of this writing.300
Restrictive zoning regulations provide another example of how
asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits can produce questionable
policy. Most people in the United States currently live in apartments or
houses that they own or rent for relatively long periods of time; in the past,
a broader range of housing options were common.301 Many people were
boarders, renting rooms in families’ homes; others lived in rooming houses
299. See, e.g., AB 3216, 40th Leg. (N.J. 2015); Todd Bishop, Tesla Wins Battle Against Auto
Dealers in Washington State, But Future Rivals Are Screwed, GEEKWIRE (Feb. 18, 2014, 4:05 PM),
http://www.geekwire.com/2014/tesla-wins-battle-auto-dealers-washington-state-future-rivals-screwed;
Christopher DeMorro, Tesla Wins Big in North Carolina and New Hampshire, GAS2 (July 1, 2013),
http://gas2.org/2013/07/01/tesla-wins-big-in-north-carolina-and-new-hampshire/; Brian Fung, Tesla
Just Won a Huge Victory in New Jersey, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2015), http://wapo.st/192BExN;
Andrew Ganz, New Hampshire to Allow Tesla, Others to Sell Cars Direct to Consumers,
LEFTLANENEWS (June 26, 2013, 5:05 PM), http://www.leftlanenews.com/new-hampshire-to-allowtesla-others-to-sell-cars-direct-to-consumers.html; Eric D. Stolze, A Billion Dollar Franchise Fee?
Tesla Motors’ Battle for Direct Sales: State Dealer Franchise Law and Politics, 34 FRANCHISE L.J.
293, 305 (2015).
300. These groups have successfully secured legislation barring Opternative’s business in several
states and have filed a formal complaint with the FDA asking it to take Opternative’s product off the
market nationwide. Rishi Madhok, Trouble for Opternative: The Establishment Fights Back,
TELEMEDICINE (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.telemedmag.com/article/trouble-for-opternative-theestablishment-fights-back (listing Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South
Carolina).
301. See generally ALAN DURNING, UNLOCKING HOME: THREE KEYS TO AFFORDABLE
COMMUNITIES (2013) (discussing the historic availability of low-end housing options); PAUL GROTH,
LIVING DOWNTOWN: THE HISTORY OF RESIDENTIAL HOTELS IN THE UNITED STATES (1999) (providing
a history of residential hotels and related regulation); Alan Durning, Bring Back Flophouses, Rooming
Houses, and Microapartments, SLATE: MONEYBOX (July 17, 2013, 1:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/business/moneybox/2013/07/sros_flophouses_microapartments_smart_cities_are_finally_allowi
ng_the_right.html.
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or residential hotels.302 Over time, zoning rules made these increasingly
scarce. A major driver of this process was that these restrictions, by
reducing the supply of housing, created concentrated benefits for local
homeowners by raising the value of their homes, while the costs were
spread more diffusely. Over time, the restricted supply of housing has
contributed to a dramatic increase in housing prices.303
The restrictive zoning described above extends to other types of land
use as well. Hosting a dinner party for your friends is legal, but if you were
to serve the same dinner to paying customers, you would run afoul of
regulations in many cities.304 Most cities require developments to set aside
large amounts of space for parking.305 And so on. Taken together, these
kinds of restrictions can have a significant negative impact, producing
massive demographic shifts, reducing economic growth, and damaging the
environment.306
Regulatory entrepreneurship has the potential to partially ameliorate
some of these problems. For example, it does not seem coincidental that
one of Airbnb’s toughest fights has been in San Francisco, a city with
particularly restrictive zoning rules.307 San Francisco is located on a
peninsula, so the only obvious way for the city to add housing units and
business space is to grow vertically.308 Yet most of San Francisco’s
neighborhoods restrict maximum building height to forty feet, and severely
restrict how those buildings can be used.309 At the same time, local
homeowners have strong incentives to resist development, and they have
done so310—and the cost of residential and commercial real estate has
302. See DURNING, supra note 301.
303. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up?, 95 AM. ECON. REV.
329, 329 (2005).
304. See Rachel Swan, Airbnb’s New Dinner Sharing Venture “Completely Illegal” (Update),
S.F. WEEKLY (June 4, 2014, 1:21 PM), http://www.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2014/06/04/airbnbs-newdinner-sharing-venture-completely-illegal-update.
305. DONALD SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING 21–22 (2005).
306. See, e.g., id.; Edward L. Glaeser et al., Urban Growth and Housing Supply, 6 J. ECON. GEO.
71, 74–77 (2006); David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1674–75 (2013); Timothy
B. Lee, Zoning Laws Are Strangling Silicon Valley, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2011, 3:56 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2011/09/19/zoning-laws-are-strangling-silicon-valley.
307. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 306, at 1693–94.
308. Kyle Russell, This One Intersection Explains Why Housing Is So Expensive in San
Francisco, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 8, 2014, 6:04 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-housing-is-soexpensive-in-san-francisco-2014-4.
309. Id.
310. Kim-Mai Cutler, How Burrowing Owls Lead To Vomiting Anarchists (or SF’s Housing
Crisis Explained), TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 14, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/04/14/sf-housing.
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soared.311 Airbnb, by enabling rental transactions that would otherwise not
be possible, allows greater utilization of existing space and structures,
effectively expanding the supply of real estate.312 Moreover, by allowing
property owners and tenants to lease out unused residential space, Airbnb
increases the range of uses to which property can be put. Similarly, Airbnb
has launched a dinner sharing venture that allows users to host dinner
parties for paying guests—effectively turning residential property into
small restaurants.313 Airbnb is hardly unique in this respect; many other
regulatory entrepreneurs undermine and reduce the impact of restrictive
zoning regimes.314
3. The Limits of Regulatory Entrepreneurship
While regulatory entrepreneurship can ameliorate some of the political
economy problems described above, it is no panacea. The limits and
potential downsides of regulatory entrepreneurship are considerable.
First, regulatory entrepreneurs’ ability to change the law will vary
significantly depending on the nature of the business and the law in
question; this creates real limits on regulatory entrepreneurs’ ability to
effect legal change. As noted above, platform companies are especially
well-suited for regulatory entrepreneurship, but the platform model is not
311. Anna Marie Erwert, San Francisco’s Median Rent Hits a Ridiculous $4,225, SF GATE (June
2, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://blog.sfgate.com/ontheblock/2015/06/02/san-franciscos-median-rent-hits-aridiculous-4225; Riley McDermid, Soaring S.F. Rents Restrict Tech Companies Ability to Expand, S.F.
BUS. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 7:29 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/real-estate/2016/
01/tech-office-rent.html.
312. Lobel, supra note 163, at 96–97.
313. Swan, supra note 304. See also Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper
Clubs, Pop-Up Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16, 24, 26 (2015)
(examining the regulation of “pop-up restaurants” and “underground dining”).
314. Examples abound. A number of other companies, including Eat With, SupperKing, Feastly,
and LeftOverSwap, have taken similar approaches to Airbnb’s dinner-sharing business. Swan, supra
note 304. Cherry sought to turn every parking spot in San Francisco into a de facto car wash. See Shah,
supra note 256. HonkMobile, Rover, WhereiPark, and other startups have tried to turn residential
driveways into commercial parking lots. Vanessa Lu, Parking Apps Will Allow Owners to Rent Out
Parking Spots by the Hour, TORONTO STAR (May 21, 2015), http://www.thestar.com/business/
2015/05/21/parking-apps-will-allow-owners-to-rent-out-parking-spots-by-the-hour.html. Filld, WeFuel,
Yoshi, Purple, and Booster Fuels built their businesses around providing on-demand fuel delivery for
parked cars throughout their areas of operation, effectively turning every parking spot into a gas station
while limiting their own real estate footprint in costly downtown areas. Eric Newcomer, Gas Delivery
Startups Want to Fill Up Your Car Anywhere. Is That Allowed?, BLOOMBERG: TECH. (May 1, 2016,
8:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-02/gas-delivery-startups-want-to-fill-upyour-car-anywhere-is-that-allowed.
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always a good fit for a particular business. Moreover, some policy
problems are not amenable to being solved by a business of any type; a
successful business based around fundamental tax reform seems unlikely,
for example.
Even when regulatory entrepreneurship is a viable business strategy,
regulatory entrepreneurs are not saints or altruists; they are profit-seeking
actors, and they will generally use their political power to further their
profit-seeking goals. Simply put, regulatory entrepreneurs do not want to
get the socially optimal result, they want the result that is best for them.
This can lead to sub-optimal outcomes in a variety of ways.
To start, it is possible that the regulatory entrepreneur may push social
policy away from the optimal outcome. The most direct way this can
happen is when the regulatory entrepreneur’s business is built on reversing
an efficient regulatory regime. When regulatory entrepreneurs change the
law through quiet lobbying, without popular support, their behavior is
consistent with a story of regulatory capture or rent-seeking and can
produce all of the same negative consequences.
When regulatory entrepreneurs succeed by building popular support
for their desired legal changes, there is more cause for optimism that those
changes are increasing general welfare. Yet, even in these instances, some
caution is merited. Popular support is a good indicator that a change in the
law is a positive one, but there are several circumstances in which popular
support may give little confidence that a legal change is socially desirable.
For example, a majority of voters may support repealing a socially
beneficial law if some of the law’s benefits accrue to individuals who are
not voters.315 This can happen when a law imposes restrictions on residents
to reduce pollution, and the benefits of that reduced pollution extend into
other jurisdictions. It can also happen when laws benefit children,
convicted felons, or immigrants who have not been naturalized.
Another circumstance in which popular support may be entitled to less
weight is when there is a strong paternalism argument for an existing law.
This can arise when there is a reason to believe people will fail to
adequately look out for their own interests, such as laws restricting
gambling out of concern for the social costs of gambling addictions and the
315. For a discussion of examples of this in the context of shareholder voting, see Jordan M. Barry
et al., On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership,
99 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1124–26 (2013).
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impact on disadvantaged or vulnerable populations;316 critics of marijuana
legalization have raised similar arguments.317 It can also arise when people
have poor information that prevents them from understanding what they are
getting or giving up by taking a certain action.318 Naturally, views will vary
on the merits of different laws rooted in morality or paternalism; the point
is simply that some laws may be defended as socially important, even if
unpopular.
Regulatory entrepreneurship can also produce social costs in smaller
ways; the regulatory entrepreneur may use its power to improve one policy
outcome while worsening others. For example, many economists look
favorably on Uber’s efforts to increase competition in the taxi industry and
to make prices more flexible.319 At the same time, Uber has often pushed
for lower levels of required insurance coverage and less rigorous
background checks than regulators favored.320 It is plausible that Uber’s
preferred outcomes on these issues are inefficient or socially undesirable,
and that the regulators would forge a better rule without Uber’s
influence.321 Similar questions arise with respect to Uber’s attempts to have
its drivers treated as independent contractors instead of employees.322 Other
316. See Bruce P. Keller, The Game’s the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal
Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1569 (1999) (“For more than a century, Americans have believed that the
social ills fostered by gambling outweigh its recreational value. As a result, gambling has been
extensively regulated.” (footnote omitted)); Christopher Koopman & Jim Pagels, The Doomed Crusade
Against Daily Fantasy Sports, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 16, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/
article/427106/doomed-crusade-against-daily-fantasy-sports-christopher-koopman-jim-pagels
(criticizing the legal developments against fantasy sports company sites as paternalistic and not serving
the interest of consumer protection).
317. See David Brooks, Weed: Been There. Done That., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2014),
http://nyti.ms/Knnknu.
318. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Filling a Regulatory Gap: It Is Time to Regulate Over-TheCounter Derivatives, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 123, 131 (2009) (“One of the longtime premises of
securities regulation is that investors need protection not only against those who would take advantage
of them, but also against themselves.”).
319. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 272.
320. Weise, supra note 24.
321. See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 90–93
(2015) (discussing the social costs and benefits of Uber, including with regard to safety, privacy,
discrimination, and labor standards).
322. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the
Modern Economy, 96 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1673, 1680–91 (2016); Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak,
Uber, TaskRabbit, & Co: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37
COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y J. 619, 637 (2016); Christopher Mims, How Everyone Gets the ‘Sharing’
Economy Wrong, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-everyonegets-the-sharing-economy-wrong-1432495921.
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examples abound.323
Even when regulatory entrepreneurs are fighting to change inefficient
or otherwise flawed laws, they may produce limited reform measures that
meet the company’s goals, but do not address larger social concerns.324 For
example, Tesla’s New Jersey law, considered a huge political victory for
Tesla, is quite narrow. It only allows Tesla to operate up to four dealerships
in the state.325 More significantly, it only applies to companies that
manufacture zero-emissions vehicles and that were licensed by New Jersey
prior to 2014—essentially, only Tesla.326 In Washington, the bill Tesla
secured enables it to open as many dealerships as it likes, but the bill is
similarly restricted to companies licensed in the state before 2014, which
again means just Tesla.327 Other innovators—for example, Elio Motors,
which has announced plans to produce a car that retails for $6,800 and gets
eighty-four miles per gallon on the highway—would not qualify.328
Similarly, when Elio has lobbied states for legislation permitting it to make
direct sales to consumers, the Elio-enabling bills are sufficiently narrow
that they do not apply to Tesla.329
These types of grandfathering rules are quite common. For instance,
the Air Cargo Deregulation Act enabled the growth of the modern air cargo
323. For instance, commentators and policymakers have similarly questioned whether Airbnb
negatively impacts local housing markets. See, e.g., Ashlee Kieler, Senators Call for Inquiry into
Impact of Airbnb & Other Short-Term Rentals on Affordable Housing, CONSUMERIST (July 14, 2016,
11:52 AM), https://consumerist.com/2016/07/14/senators-call-for-inquiry-into-impact-of-airbnb-othershort-term-rentals-on-affordable-housing (discussing letter from Senators Brian Schatz, Dianne
Feinstein, and Elizabeth Warren to the FTC urging a study of the impact of Airbnb on communities
with regard to issues of affordable housing, racial discrimination, and public health and safety); San
Francisco and New York Weigh Airbnb’s Effect on Rent, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2015),
https://nyti.ms/1dHO0Ot (providing a variety of viewpoints on the social and economic impact of
Airbnb).
324. This may be due to the regulatory entrepreneur’s active desire to limit its competition, or
simple apathy for others, but it can also stem from pressure by industry incumbents and regulators.
Barry & Caron, supra note 62, at 75 (“Regulators worry that new benefits will be abused. Accordingly,
they are usually inclined to write new benefits narrowly—and established-industry groups competing
with new businesses may work to reinforce that inclination.”).
325. AB 3216, 40th Leg. (N.J. 2015).
326. Id.
327. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 299.
328. See Lao et al., supra note 52. See also Jim Gorzelany, Three-Wheel $6,800 Elio Delayed
(Again), Could Be Too Little, Too Late, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2016, 12:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jimgorzelany/2016/03/14/three-wheel-6800-elio-delayed-again-could-be-too-little-too-late.
329. See, e.g., id.; S.B. 268 (Mich. 2015), http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2015-2016/
billintroduced/Senate/htm/2015-SIB-0268.htm.
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industry and was heavily instigated by Federal Express.330 The Act gave
special positive treatment to existing carriers—essentially, Federal Express
and Flying Tiger Line—including a one-year window during which they
could enter new markets without competition.331 But perhaps the best
example comes from ResponsibleOhio, which put forward a ballot measure
to legalize marijuana in Ohio—but only if it was grown at one of ten
predetermined sites, all of which were owned by members of
ResponsibleOhio.332 This would have given ResponsibleOhio a monopoly
on legal marijuana sales in the state.333
More fundamentally, some people might worry about giving business
interests additional political power.334 Further, because much of law
involves limiting and managing harms, politically empowering companies
that intend to “Move Fast and Break Things,” as some startups famously
implore their employees to do, could be particularly problematic.335 For
instance, Uber has flouted not only taxi regulations, but also lobbying
laws,336 and the company’s aggressive tactics have bled into other parts of
its business as well. In its early operations, Uber was dogged by persistent
rumors that it had its employees order and then cancel thousands of rides
from competing companies.337 Perhaps more troubling, a top Uber
330. Fisch, supra note 211, at 1512–18.
331. Id.
332. Graham, supra note 59.
333. Id.
334. Many Americans believe that big corporations and other business interests already wield too
much political power. Lydia Saad, Americans Decry Power of Lobbyists, Corporations, Banks, Feds,
GALLUP (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147026/americans-decry-power-lobbyistscorporations-banks-feds.aspx.
335. Ashlee Vance, Facebook: The Making of 1 Billion Users, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2012, 4:06
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-10-04/facebook-the-making-of-1-billion-users.
336. Brad Schmidt, Uber Fined $2,000 for Violating Portland Lobbying Rules, OREGONIAN:
OREGON LIVE (Jan. 5, 2016, 11:20 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2016/01/uber_
fined_2000_for_violating.html (reporting that the auditor imposed “the maximum fine because she
found that Uber showed a pattern of noncompliance, noncooperation and incomplete disclosures” that
“undermine[d] the City’s decision-making process and contributed to the erosion of the public's
confidence in the legislative result”).
337. Rip Empson, Black Car Competitor Accuses Uber of DDoS-Style Attack; Uber Admits
Tactics Are “Too Aggressive,” TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 24, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/24/blackcar-competitor-accuses-uber-of-shady-conduct-ddos-style-attack-uber-expresses-regret; Erica Fink,
Uber’s Dirty Tricks Quantified: Rival Counts 5,560 Canceled Rides, CNN TECH (Aug. 12, 2014, 5:11
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/11/technology/uber-fake-ride-requests-lyft. Uber’s competitors
have also faced similar accusations. Ryan Lawler, Uber Strikes Back, Claiming Lyft Drivers and
Employees Canceled Nearly 13,000 Rides, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 12, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/
08/12/uber-lyft-slap-fight.
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executive suggested hiring private investigators to dig up dirt on the
personal lives and families of specific journalists who were critical of
Uber.338 Uber quickly disavowed this plan in response to public outrage.339
The point here is not specific to Uber, however, or any particular
company. The key takeaway is that, while regulatory entrepreneurship
offers promise, there are reasons to be concerned about some of the effects
of empowering regulatory entrepreneurs. At core, regulatory entrepreneurs
are motivated to pursue their own interests, which will not always align
with the public good.
CONCLUSION
Regulatory entrepreneurs abound, and include some of the world’s
most valuable companies, both public and private. Although companies
such as Uber, Airbnb, DraftKings, Tesla, and Hyperloop are engaged in
vastly different areas of business, they are all regulatory entrepreneurs:
Each has built a business in an area fraught with legal issues, such as legal
gray areas, unfavorable laws, and potential instability. Each of these
companies has done so with the plan of remaking the legal landscape into
one that supports its business. To do this, regulatory entrepreneurs blend
political and economic actions in innovative ways and have changed the
balance of power on many political fronts.
Further, we believe that companies will continue to engage in
regulatory entrepreneurship in the future and perhaps will do so even more
frequently. As information technology rapidly advances, it lowers the cost
of political engagement. This may allow for a feedback loop in which the
greater ease with which citizens can express their preferences creates new
opportunities for companies to mobilize large groups of people to push for
legal changes on their behalf. Companies’ successes then make investors
increasingly comfortable with regulatory entrepreneurship as a business
338. Sarah Lacy, The Moment I Learned Just How Far Uber Will Go to Silence Journalists and
Attack Women, PANDO (Nov. 17, 2014), https://pando.com/2014/11/17/the-moment-i-learned-just-howfar-uber-will-go-to-silence-journalists-and-attack-women; Susan Milligan, A Ride Scare Tactic?, U.S.
NEWS (Nov. 19, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/susan-milligan/2014/11/19/
an-uber-executive-suggests-the-company-target-its-media-critics; Ben Smith, Uber Executive Suggests
Digging Up Dirt on Journalists, BUZZFEED (Nov. 17, 2014, 4:57 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
bensmith/uber-executive-suggests-digging-up-dirt-on-journalists#.nklQ88XdP.
339. Mike Isaac, Uber Executive’s Comments Leave Company Scrambling, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
2014, 12:22 AM), https://nyti.ms/2nExRSS. For a discussion of additional controversies involving
Uber, see Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays With Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2pSAyyu.

448

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:383

strategy, which expands the already-significant infrastructure (including
information technology) that supports regulatory entrepreneurs.
This raises the question of how regulatory entrepreneurship will
ultimately affect the mix of laws and regulations that society enacts. The
most successful regulatory entrepreneurs’ chief source of political power is
their army of activated users. Presumably, members of the public who
support a regulatory entrepreneur’s agenda are advancing their own selfinterest, and thus stand to gain from policy change along with the
entrepreneur. Thus, we are cautiously optimistic that the dynamics we
describe could encourage more efficient legislative regimes, particularly at
the state and local levels, at least in some instances, and could create an
environment conducive to innovation more generally. Regulatory
entrepreneurs are profit-seeking entities, however; there is strong reason to
believe they will use their political power to pursue their own interests,
with little regard to other stakeholders or society. Accordingly, regulatory
entrepreneurship may have significant negative effects. How these
positives and negatives weigh out will vary across different companies and
circumstances.

